Employed in a SNAP? The Impact of Work Requirements on Program Participation and Labor Supply

Colin Gray^{*}, Adam Leive[†], Elena Prager[‡], Kelsey Pukelis[§], and Mary Zaki[¶]

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Abstract

Work requirements are common in many U.S. safety net programs. Evidence remains limited, however, on the extent to which work requirements increase economic self-sufficiency or screen out vulnerable individuals. Using linked administrative data on food stamps (SNAP) and earnings with a regression discontinuity design, we find that work requirements reduce SNAP participation by 52 percent. Very low-income and homeless adults are disproportionately screened out. We statistically rule out employment increases of more than 2 percentage points. We find evidence of increased earnings near a key eligibility threshold, and provide conditions under which this trade-off is efficient.

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*Wayfair

[†]Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia

[‡]Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

[§]Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

[¶]Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland

Correspondence: Adam Leive, 235 McCormick Road, Garrett Hall, Charlottesville, VA 22904. Email: leive@virginia.edu. We thank David Autor, Marianne Bitler, Sebastian Calonico, Itzik Fadlon, Amy Finkelstein, Jon Gruber, Tatiana Homonoff, Ben Hyman, Brian Kovak, Tim Layton, Robert Moffitt, Matt Notowidigdo, John Pepper, Chris Ruhm, Sebastian Tello-Trillo, and seminar participants at Columbia, MIT, UVA, the Census Bureau, ASHEcon 2018, and the Chicago Health Economics Workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Jeff Price at Virginia Department of Social Services (DSS) for his support and assistance throughout the project. We also thank Nikole Cox, Claudia Jackson, Bill McMakin, and others in Virginia DSS who helped us understand institutional details and provided additional data assistance. Leive's work on this project was supported in part by grant 1R01MD014970-01 from the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities. This research does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the funders.

1 Introduction

For decades, policymakers have sought to provide benefits to low-resource households in times of need without reducing employment incentives. One common strategy is to require adults who are capable of working to sustain formal employment or participate in community service in order to receive benefits. Since 1996, some form of "work requirement" has existed in many means-tested programs, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Proponents argue that work requirements improve labor force attachment and, in the long run, promote self-sufficiency. Opponents contend that the primary effect of work requirements is to reduce benefits for the most vulnerable recipients in times of need (Hahn and Haskins 2018, Fadulu 2019). Work requirements are once again taking center stage in policy debates: SNAP enrollment has risen sharply since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, and while all states initially suspended work requirements due to the crisis, many are debating reintroducing the policy.¹ Previously, a proposed expansion of SNAP's work requirements was the central point of contention in the 2018 Farm Bill. In Medicaid, many states attempted to add work requirements before being blocked by federal court decisions in 2019 and 2020.²

This paper evaluates the impact of work requirements on the program participation and labor market outcomes of able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) in the context of SNAP. We use detailed administrative data from Virginia and a transparent regression discontinuity (RD) identification strategy that exploits the fact that participants sharply age out of work requirements at age 50.

To date, research on work requirements has struggled with several empirical challenges. First, commonly used survey data sources severely and non-randomly under-report participation in means-tested programs (Meyer et al. 2014, Ziliak 2015, Meyer and Mittag 2019). Second, defining a sample based on income and other criteria for ABAWDs inadvertently includes individuals who would not participate in SNAP under any policy regime. This overly broad sample produces an estimate that is closer to an intent-to-treat than to treatment-on-the-treated, making it difficult to distinguish small effects from low participation. Finally, selection bias may arise due to the exclusion of individuals who would have been in the study population under a different policy regime. For example, limiting the sample to incomes below a specified poverty threshold excludes

¹For example, Florida announced that work requirements would be enforced before suspending them in response to public pressure (Delgado 2020). Congress is debating extending a suspension first passed in March 2020 at the federal level (Peterson 2020).

 $^{^{2}}$ In *Gresham v. Azar*, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled against work requirements in Arkansas.

individuals who raise their incomes above this threshold *in response to* work requirements. Some argue that these biases explain the lack of evidence that work requirements cause large improvements in labor market outcomes (Rachidi and Doar 2018).

To overcome these empirical challenges, we leverage unique administrative data spanning a decade to focus on the subset of non-disabled, childless beneficiaries subject to work requirements. We identify a sample of ABAWDs who likely *would* be on SNAP absent work requirements. From 2009 to 2013, Virginia experienced a prolonged period without SNAP work requirements, which were suspended during the Great Recession and reinstated in October 2013. We identify all ABAWDs who were enrolled in SNAP at the end of this multi-year period without work requirements and then follow them forward after work requirements are reinstated. By defining the sample during a time before work requirements, this "stock" population captures our ABAWD population of interest, yielding reliable estimates that both minimize selection bias and capture the treatment-on-the-treated.

We find strong evidence that work requirements dramatically reduce SNAP participation among ABAWDs. Virginia's introduction of work requirements reduced overall participation among ABAWDs near the age cutoff by 52 percent eighteen months after work requirements were reinstated. This decline is twice the size estimated in other studies. Time patterns of participation, RD estimates, and placebo checks all corroborate this conclusion. Moreover, we provide suggestive evidence that the estimated magnitude of the participation reduction is generalizable to ages further from the policy cutoff. In RD analyses focusing only on the stock population, we find that the introduction of work requirements reduced the rate of eighteen-month program retention by 38 percent (24 percentage points) among existing SNAP participants.

Our longitudinal data also allow us to study screening using *ex ante* observed covariates by classifying individuals on the basis of characteristics measured up to eight years prior to treatment. This avoids the bias that would arise from classifying on characteristics that may themselves be endogenous to the policy, such as contemporaneous employment. We find that work requirements induce disproportionately higher exit among homeless beneficiaries and beneficiaries with no earned income at the time of program entry. In contrast, induced exit is disproportionately lower among those with a history of disability, who are more likely to be exempt from the work requirements.

Unlike the large effects on program participation, effects on employment are limited. Our point estimates are close to zero and we statistically rule out average employment increases above 2 percentage points. There is evidence of increased earnings near a key eligibility threshold, however, based on unconditional quantile regressions. To evaluate the costs and benefits of the policy, we calculate the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) comparing the value to participants of eliminating work requirements against the costs to the government. The MVPF implies that eliminating work requirements is likely efficient given the available evidence.

The paper builds upon a body of research studying work requirements and screening in means-tested programs. It is closely related to the theory developed by Besley and Coate (1992), which formalizes the trade-off between providing safety net benefits and avoiding work disincentives.³ The corresponding empirical literature documents the work disincentives inherent in means-tested and social insurance programs, providing evidence that income effects explain much of the causal relationship between government assistance and work (Autor and Duggan 2007, Fetter and Lockwood 2018). A handful of papers explore this relationship specifically in the setting of food stamps (Fraker and Moffitt 1988, Keane and Moffitt 1998, Hagstrom 1996, Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012).

A complementary empirical literature studies whether work requirements can help to circumvent the trade-off in Besley and Coate (1992) by promoting work. In the context of traditional welfare programs, a number of studies find that work requirements increase employment and program exit, but decrease total income as many households exit without employment (Fang and Keane 2004, Grogger and Karoly 2005, Greenberg et al. 2009, Chan 2013, Card and Hyslop 2005, Chan and Moffitt 2018). A number of papers investigate this question in the context of SNAP. They find mixed results, likely due to differences in methods, data, and the potential presence of selection biases and non-treated populations as discussed above. Contemporaneous with this paper, several papers use the age 50 eligibility cutoff for identification (Stacy et al. 2018, Harris 2020, Han 2020, Cuffey et al. 2015, Ritter 2018). These studies primarily rely on survey data, and find mixed results for participation and labor market outcomes. In an earlier study using administrative SNAP data, Ribar et al. (2010) find moderate impacts on participation but do not estimate causal effects on labor market outcomes. Research describing how aggregate SNAP participation moves with macroeconomic conditions finds large reductions in participation coincident with work requirements (Wilde et al. 2000, Ziliak et al. 2003, Ganong and Liebman 2018). We review these closely related papers in detail in Section 2.2.

Our results also contribute to the literature on screening in means-tested programs, which Besley and Coate (1992) and Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) highlight as a policy tool to increase targeting efficiency. A recent literature empirically studies the role of screening

³Additional theoretical work includes Moffitt (2006) and Beaudry et al. (2009). The former assumes the government has a non-welfarist objective and is instead paternalistic, similar to Besley and Coate (1992), while the latter assumes the government has a welfarist objective.

by enrollment and recertification processes in Medicaid, SNAP, and disability programs (Deshpande and Li 2019, Finkelstein and Notowidigdo 2019, Gray 2019, Homonoff and Somerville 2019). Our finding of disproportionate program exit among the homeless and individuals without pre-SNAP income provides new insights on the screening effects of work requirements, in particular.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses work requirements in SNAP, the policy variation available, and the administrative data we use. Section 3 documents participation survival curves and trends over time, and presents our main regression discontinuity estimates of total participation reductions. Section 4 uses our stock population definition to estimate the effect of work requirements on program retention, assess screening impacts, and study the role of additional verification requirements. Section 5 presents regression discontinuity evidence regarding labor market outcomes, including analyses of heterogeneous impacts along the earnings distribution and a discussion of the implications for the marginal value of public funds. Section 6 concludes.

2 Setting and Data

2.1 The SNAP Program

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), previously called the Food Stamp Program, is among the largest poverty alleviation programs in the United States. In 2015, the program provided over \$69 billion in benefits to over 45 million individuals, representing 14 percent of the U.S. population (Ganong and Liebman 2018). The program has been widely studied: researchers have documented the program's impacts on food insecurity (Gundersen et al. 2011, Mabli and Ohls 2014, Gregory et al. 2015, Schmidt et al. 2016), poverty (Short 2015, Tiehen et al. 2015), health and economic outcomes (Almond et al. 2011, Bitler 2015, Gregory and Deb 2015, Hoynes et al. 2016), educational test scores (Gassman-Pines and Bellows 2018), and criminal recidivism (Tuttle 2019).

While the SNAP program primarily uses federal funds and is regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), it is administered by each state individually. The core aspects of the SNAP program are the same across all U.S. states. Each month, households in the program get money loaded onto an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) card, which they can use to buy most food items at authorized grocery or convenience stores. With some exceptions, households are generally deemed ineligible for benefits if their gross income (before deductions) exceeds 130 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) or if their net income (after deductions) exceeds 100 percent of the FPL. Some states also use

a household asset test. The federal government annually sets a maximum monthly benefit amount that increases with household size. A household's actual monthly benefit amount is smaller than the maximum if the household has positive net income, defined as gross income less a set of possible deductions (e.g., medical expenses, dependent care). The actual benefit amount is determined by subtracting from the maximum benefit 30 cents for each dollar of positive net income.⁴

To keep track of income and deductions, participants in most states are required to submit periodic "recertifications," typically at 6- or 12-month intervals. These verifications require substantial paperwork, including documentation of deductions and earnings (e.g., medical bills or pay stubs), and the majority of attrition from the SNAP program happens at these deadlines (Hastings and Shapiro 2018, Gray 2019, Homonoff and Somerville 2019).

In addition to income limits and periodic recertifications, SNAP imposes two distinct types of work requirements. First, the "general" work requirement dictates that participants aged 16–59, with some exceptions, must complete work registration, accept suitable employment if it is offered, not voluntarily quit a job or reduce hours below 30 hours per week, be willing to report information to the state agency to enable determination of employment status, and comply with an employment and training or workfare program if offered. Second, the "ABAWD" or "time limit" work requirement applies only to able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs). ABAWDs are defined as adults aged 18–49 who do not report a child in the household and do not meet a limited set of exemptions (e.g., a confirmed disability).⁵ These individuals must be employed, participate in qualifying job training programs, or do approved community service for at least 80 hours each month. ABAWDs who do not meet these requirements may receive benefits for a maximum of three months within a three-year period. We use the phrase "work requirements" to refer to these ABAWD work requirements and not general work registration requirements.

Some ABAWDs may be exempt from work requirements through one of three channels. First, counties with distressed labor markets according to specific USDA criteria are permitted to waive ABAWD work requirements (Appendix A). Second, states are permitted to exempt up to 15 percent of ABAWDs from work requirements at their discretion, and can bank or spend those waivers across different years to a limited extent. Third, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 exempted *all* counties in all states from ABAWD work requirements as part of the Great Recession

 $^{^{4}}$ There is a 20 percent earned income deduction. This implies that SNAP benefits effectively decline by 24 cents for each additional dollar of *earned* income.

⁵See USDA Food and Nutrition Service, "SNAP Work Requirements" May 2019, for more information: www.fns.usda.gov/snap/work-requirements.

stimulus package.⁶ Individual states began to reinstate work requirements over the subsequent few years. Virginia reinstated ABAWD work requirements statewide on October 1, 2013. A small subset of economically distressed counties were later re-exempted, and are dropped from our main analysis. Appendix A lists these counties.

To illustrate how work requirements may affect program participation and labor supply, Appendix Figure A.1 presents a stylized budget constraint for ABAWDs. The graph plots income on the vertical axis against hours not working on the horizontal axis, similar to the representations in Bitler et al. (2006) and Han (2020). Work requirements produce a notch in the budget constraint at the minimum hours threshold. Some SNAP participants would choose to increase labor supply to retain benefits compared to their preferred choice without work requirements. This response represents the "incentive effect" of the policy, represented in Figure A.1 by people with preferences U^1 relocating to the notch. On the other hand, SNAP participants working few hours in the absence of work requirements might find it too costly to reach the hours threshold and therefore exit the program. Some may work more than they previously did to make up for the lost SNAP benefits. This response represents an "income effect", represented in the figure by people with preferences U^2 locating along segment FE but below the hours threshold.

2.2 Related Literature

As discussed in the introduction, this paper is most closely related to other papers studying the effects of work requirements in SNAP, although our empirical approach departs from this literature. This section reviews both published work and contemporaneous working papers. We consider three sets of papers using different types of data.

First, several studies using aggregated state- or county-level SNAP caseloads document that the implementation of work requirements coincides with substantial reductions in program participation (Wilde et al. 2000, Ziliak et al. 2003, Ganong and Liebman 2018). These studies typically use variation over time and geography in work requirements policies. For example, Ganong and Liebman (2018) find that work requirement waivers can explain 10 percent of increases in SNAP participation during and after the Great Recession. In contrast, Danielson and Klerman (2006) use an index that measures state-level severity of ABAWD time-limits based on state-specific implementations of work requirements and find no significant difference between the index

⁶A few states and localities, including Texas and New York City, kept work requirements in place despite the exemption option provided by ARRA: www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/states-have-requested-waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-unemployment. Virginia used the ARRA exemptions as written by USDA.

and Food Stamp participation. These studies are somewhat limited by the aggregate nature of their data and the potential for legislative endogeneity.

Second, a set of contemporaneous papers closely related to our work use microdata and the age 50 cutoff as a source of identification (Stacy et al. 2018, Harris 2020, Han 2020, Cuffey et al. 2015, Ritter 2018). These studies almost exclusively use cross-sectional survey data from either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey (CPS) to measure labor market outcomes. Ritter (2018) additionally uses a sample of administrative records of SNAP participants from public Quality Control (QC) Records, which provides a useful cross-section but cannot be used to create a "stock" population for analysis. Samples in these studies are often constructed based on endogenous criteria, particularly QC-based samples which suffer from mechanical selection bias.⁷ In addition, estimating the effects of work requirements in cross-sectional data is likely to understate the treatment-on-the-treated (see Appendix B). This potential underestimation would be driven by overly broad sample definitions that include people who would not be on SNAP even absent work requirements. For example, we see that at most 20 percent of those in *control* samples analyzed in survey-based studies participate in SNAP. In contrast, our control sample has 100 percent SNAP participation in month zero and 63 percent in month 18.

Furthermore, labor market participation in survey-based populations exceeds that in administrative records. For example, Harris (2020) reweights survey data to match the demographic composition of ABAWDs in the administrative QC data. Even with this reasonable adjustment, Harris' survey-based ABAWD population has an employment rate of 71 percent, while the ABAWD population in the QC data has an employment rate of 24 percent. Similarly, Han (2020) has a control sample with a 75 percent employment rate. Stacy et al. (2018) have a control sample with a lower but still high employment rate of 48 percent from the same survey, potentially because they condition on SNAP participation in the previous year (which may be endogenous). In Ritter (2018), 40 to 58 percent of the CPS-based control sample work more than 20 hours per week while only 10 to 25 percent of the administrative QC-based control sample do. In contrast, only 17 percent of the Virginia ABAWD SNAP population (and 19 percent of our stock population) is employed when work requirements are reinstated. This is comparable to the 17 percent employed fraction of the nationwide SNAP ABAWD population, as reported in the 2013 QC data.⁸ Subsequently, 29 percent of our stock population near age 50 is employed 18 months after

⁷Ritter (2018) discusses these issues at length.

 $^{^{8}}$ We designate as ABAWDs individuals in the QC data who are non-disabled, aged 18 to 49, in childless SNAP units and who are not exempt from work registration.

reinstatement, which is appreciably smaller than in other study control groups.

These papers find mixed results on the effects of work requirements on employment and SNAP participation (see Appendix B for a summary of findings, strengths, and limitations of these studies). For example, using ACS data, Stacy et al. (2018), Harris (2020), and Han (2020) find that work requirements decrease SNAP participation by 10 to 15 percent. While Stacy et al. (2018) find no significant impacts on labor market outcomes, Harris (2020) finds employment increases of 1.5 to 1.8 percent. Han (2020) finds no significant impacts on employment but finds impacts on hours worked. Using CPS data, both Cuffey et al. (2015) and Ritter (2018) find no significant impacts of work requirements on labor market outcomes. Cuffey et al. (2015) further find no significant impacts on SNAP participation. As discussed above, we estimate program retention effects that are more than double the magnitudes found in these papers.⁹ Even so, our estimates of labor market effects are comparable to theirs. Our results substantiate a conclusion of truly small labor market effects because of our estimates' tight link to the treatment-on-the-treated combined with accurate administrative data on employment.

In the third and final category of related papers, Ribar et al. (2010) use householdlevel administrative data from South Carolina between 1996 and 2005 and variation in work requirements across counties and over time. In contrast, our analysis is at the individual level, consistent with how work requirements are applied within ABAWD households, and uses a discontinuity for identification. Ribar et al. (2010) find participation reductions of up to 20 percent, which are less than half the magnitude that we estimate. This discrepancy may arise from their pre-Great Recession sample period, from heterogeneity in impacts across states, or from the use of a sample selected to exclude those who would enroll in SNAP (only) in the absence of work requirements. Ribar et al. (2010) do not examine employment or earnings as a separate outcome, but instead analyze the rate of exits from SNAP among those with (UI-covered) employment. As we describe in Section 5.2, however, the interpretation of such regressions is not straightforward because the empirical design conditions on an outcome, thereby inducing changes in sample composition that frustrates causal estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

2.3 Policy Variation in Virginia

We rely on variation in SNAP work requirement policies to identify the effects of work requirements. Our main identification strategy takes advantage of program eligibility requirements that change sharply based on age. ABAWD work requirements apply to

 $^{^{9}}$ Some of the differences in results may also arise from across-state heterogeneity in the impacts of work requirements.

childless non-exempt adults aged 18–49. In contrast, participants aged 50 or older are not subject to the same time limits on benefits, irrespective of work status. The sharp policy difference between childless adults in their late forties and similar childless adults in their early fifties allows us to use a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Furthermore, there are no other rules within SNAP, TANF, or Medicaid that change discontinuously at age 50 that can confound this identification strategy.¹⁰ Eligibility requirements for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) do loosen at age 50 due to the occupational grids used to determine disability status (Chen and van der Klaauw 2008, Deshpande et al. 2019). In light of this, we check for (and find no evidence of) confounding effects at the age 50 discontinuity in "placebo" time periods when work requirements were not in effect.

For supporting evidence, we take advantage of cross-sectional and time series variation in counties that received waivers exempting ABAWDs from the work requirements.¹¹ Virginia implemented a statewide exemption of the ABAWD work requirements in 2009 as part of the ARRA stimulus package. Virginia then reinstated ABAWD work requirements statewide on October 1, 2013. Starting in May 2014, however, 23 of Virginia's 133 counties were granted county-wide exemptions from work requirements on the basis of high unemployment rates. The paper focuses on the 110 counties in which work requirements remained on after October 2013. Data from the 23 counties reinstating exemptions are used in supporting analyses.

When Virginia implemented the work requirements policy in October 2013, non-compliant ABAWDs were not immediately removed from SNAP. The work requirements did not become binding until up to eighteen months later. SNAP participants whose participation spell began prior to the reinstatement of work requirements generally had 12-month recertification periods. Importantly, compliance with work requirements was not evaluated until their *next* scheduled recertification after the reinstatement of work requirements. Within this group, those who were not in compliance at this next recertification were given a 6-month period before their subsequent recertification, at which point they would be removed from the program if they were not meeting work requirements. For example, an ABAWD who entered in September 2013 might not make contact with the SNAP office again until they were notified of upcoming recertification requirements in August 2014. If the participant remained otherwise eligible but was not working, she could be certified for another 6 months. In this case, she would not be

¹⁰Moreover, childless adults were not eligible for TANF or Medicaid in Virginia during our sample period.

¹¹In addition to Virginia's 95 counties, the state classifies 38 independent cities as county-equivalents for Census purposes. For brevity, our description refers to both "true" counties and these 38 cities as counties.

removed from SNAP until March 2015.¹² In contrast, newly entering ABAWDs after October 2013 were given 4 to 6 month recertification periods (depending on their month of entry). A 4-month recertification is the standard dictated by USDA policy.¹³ Virginia was able to initially and temporarily implement a 6-month recertification policy by using the 15 percent exemptions discussed in Section 2.1 (see Appendix A for more details).¹⁴ In order to accurately capture the impact of work requirements while accounting for this gradual roll-out, our main RD estimates focus on participation and employment at the completion of the roll-out in March 2015, eighteen months after the official reinstatement of work requirements. We provide estimates for a range of other time periods in secondary analyses.

2.4 Administrative Data on SNAP Participation and Earnings

We use annual administrative records from the Virginia Department of Social Services (DSS) between 2007 and 2015. The files include data on demographics, disability and employment status, receipt of unearned income, and the first and last calendar months of every SNAP participation spell. Demographics include age in months, gender, education, race, zip code of residence, and county of the participant's SNAP program office.¹⁵ In addition to age, two additional variables are relevant for determining ABAWD status. The first measures the status of general work registration and reasons for any exemption using 21 categorical values. The second measures disability status, also using 21 categorical values, including which disability programs the SNAP participant is enrolled in. Our main specifications consider individuals who have no known exemptions or disabilities and have no children in their SNAP household. These individuals would typically be considered ABAWDs if they are under age 50, and non-ABAWDs if they are over age 50.¹⁶

We match these administrative records from DSS to employment records collected by

 $^{^{12}}$ Virginia state officials have confirmed that participants were not informed of their work requirements nor their next recertification period in advance of recertification.

¹³These four months are composed of the 3 allotted months of benefits without meeting work requirements within a 3-year window as well as an initial partial month of benefits that does not count towards the 3 allotted months.

¹⁴The USDA explicitly encouraged states to apply the 15 percent waivers to ABAWDs in order to extend their eligibility periods immediately following the expiry of statewide work requirements exemptions: https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/FY-2015-ABAWD-Exemptions-Memo-Adjusted-for-Carryover.pdf.

¹⁵Not all city-counties have a physical SNAP office located within their borders, but all ordinary counties do. SNAP applicants who apply for SNAP through the wrong program office are still subject to the rules of the county of their residence and their applications are typically either transferred or denied.

¹⁶To validate this definition in our data, we compare our count of ABAWDs with official counts using external data provided by Virgina DSS that includes a detailed set of codes for ABAWD status and exemptions. The number of ABAWDs in our data is 96.5 percent of the official count, providing confidence that we are accurately measuring ABAWDs among SNAP participants.

the Virginia Employment Commission as part of the state's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. These records contain a panel of quarterly earnings from 2005 to 2017.¹⁷ Using the UI records, we define quarterly employment as an indicator for appearing in the wage data that quarter.¹⁸ In analyzing earnings outcomes, we deflate quarterly earnings to 2018Q1 USD using the all-items CPI.

The ability to link SNAP administrative records with administrative earnings histories provides substantial advantages relative to survey data. The first advantage is improved accuracy: linking UI data to administrative SNAP records allows us to avoid the documented under-reporting of SNAP participation and mismeasurement of income in surveys. Survey data have been shown to undercount SNAP participants by up to 40 percent (Meyer and Mittag 2019, Meyer et al. 2014) and to measure income with systematic errors (Bee and Mitchell 2017). As discussed in the introduction, the linked longitudinal data allow us to more closely approach the treatment-on-the-treated estimate and minimize selection bias, which is unusual in the literature on work requirements. In addition, the panel nature of the data makes possible two sets of analyses that are not feasible in repeated cross-sections. First, we examine the time path of impacts of work requirements, including whether they induce an increase in self-sufficiency in the medium run. Cross-sectional data will, in contrast, average effects from both new entrants and long-term program participants. Second, we study the screening effects of work requirements by classifying individuals on the basis of characteristics measured up to eight years prior to treatment, avoiding the bias that would arise from classifying on contemporaneous characteristics that may themselves be endogenous to the policy. Finally, unlike studies that use public-use versions of surveys, we have more precise information on geography, the timing of observations and age. This allows us to more accurately identify who is subject to work requirement waivers or exemptions and to execute a more refined regression discontinuity identification on the age running variable.¹⁹

Despite these advantages, the data also have some limitations. First, the SNAP administrative data do not report benefit amounts. Second, UI wage records do not include

¹⁷In studying the labor market effects of vocation rehabilitation services in Virginia, Dean et al. (2017) show that Virginia Employment Commission earnings closely match Social Security Administration earnings records.

¹⁸Our results are robust to alternative definitions of employment that we have tested, such as an indicator for earning above the full-time minimum wage.

¹⁹The public-use versions of the ACS and the CPS aggregate geographic identifiers from low-population counties into larger geographic units, resulting in aggregated units with mixed work requirements policies. The public-use versions also report rounded age, reducing the precision of RD designs using the age 50 cutoff. Stacy et al. (2018) overcome these issues using a restricted-use version of the ACS that reports county-level geography, exact age of respondent on the day of the survey, and the date of survey. However, even in the restricted-use version of the ACS, estimated effects on SNAP participation are diluted because the ACS asks whether a survey respondent was ever on SNAP in the last twelve months, and all ABAWDs (regardless of work status) can receive SNAP benefits for three months when work requirements are in place.

all workers, and in particular miss self-employed workers, federal employees, and independent contractors.²⁰ This fact does not threaten the validity of our estimates unless the *composition* of employment changes due to work requirements. For example, our method could under-estimate the impact of work requirements on labor force participation if the policy primarily impacts the transition from non-employment to self-employment. Our results include robustness checks that help to account for sources of employment that are self-reported by SNAP participants and not covered by UI (Appendix Figure C.10). We find no impact of work requirements on this measure of self-reported employment.

A second limitation is that estimates from the Virginia data may not generalize to other states if there is across-state heterogeneity in the impacts of work requirements. While we are not equipped to evaluate such heterogeneity, we can compare the compositions of the Virginia and national SNAP populations on observables. We compute these comparisons using Fiscal Year 2013 QC data for internal consistency within this paragraph, and then return to the Virginia administrative data for all subsequent summary statistics and analyses. In Fiscal Year 2013, the average SNAP household size in both Virginia and the rest of the country is 1.3. The fraction of individuals whom we would classify as ABAWDs is 7.0 percent in Virginia and 6.3 percent in the rest of the country. The demographic composition is similar except on race.²¹ The fraction with any earned income (unearned income) is 22.6 percent (6.1 percent) in Virginia and 16.4 percent (9.6 percent) elsewhere. Finally, in terms of broad economic conditions, Virginia's unemployment rate was in the second-lowest quartile among states during our main sample period (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016).

Table 1 describes the characteristics of Virginia SNAP participants in September 2013 (the last month before the reinstatement of work requirements). We report descriptive statistics separately for adults whom we classify as ABAWDs and adults whom we do not classify as ABAWDs due to either their age, having a dependent, or satisfying a specific exemption.²² In this month, there are 89,507 unique ABAWDs, which represents 9.1 percent of the total beneficiary population. The mean age of ABAWDs is 32.8 years, about ten years younger than other adults. A smaller share of ABAWDs are female (40 percent of ABAWDs vs. 67 percent of other adults), married (7 percent vs. 21 percent), report unearned income to DSS (7 percent vs. 41 percent), or have ever reported a disability in the past (10 percent vs. 35 percent). According to UI records, ABAWDs have slightly lower levels of employment

 $^{^{20}}$ Self-employed workers comprise about 10 percent of the U.S. workforce. See, for example, Steven Hipple and Laurel Hammond (2016) "Self Employment in the United States."

²¹The average age is 36.2 in Virginia and 32.4 in the rest of the country, and the female fraction is 39.4 percent in Virginia and 40.3 percent elsewhere. The white fraction (47.6 percent in Virginia, 41.6 percent elsewhere) and Black fraction (51.1 percent in Virginia, 36.9 percent elsewhere) are both higher in Virginia than in the rest of the country, whereas the Hispanic fraction is lower.

²²We present descriptive statistics of all SNAP households over the entire period of our data in Appendix C.

and lower annual wage earnings than other adults on SNAP. Finally, ABAWDs are more likely to be homeless (14 percent vs. 2 percent).

	ABAWDs		Non-ABAWD Adults	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	32.8	9.7	43.1	17.1
Female	0.40	0.49	0.67	0.47
Married	0.07	0.25	0.21	0.41
Household Size	1.3	0.7	2.6	1.6
Homeless	0.14	0.34	0.02	0.14
White	0.42	0.49	0.46	0.50
Black	0.46	0.50	0.42	0.49
Some College+	0.10	0.30	0.12	0.33
Has Earned Income (DSS)	0.17	0.37	0.26	0.44
Has Unearned Income (DSS)	0.07	0.26	0.41	0.49
Avg. Annual Earnings (UI)	3,504	5,769	$4,\!642$	8,027
Fraction of Months Employed (UI)	0.32	0.34	0.31	0.39
Ever reported				
Any Disability	0.10	0.30	0.35	0.48
Exempt from Work Registration	0.39	0.49	0.77	0.42
Exempt Due to Dependent	0.11	0.31	0.32	0.47
Medicaid Recipient	0.44	0.50	0.78	0.41
TANF Recipient	0.12	0.32	0.24	0.43
SNAP E&T Participant	0.16	0.37	0.06	0.25
Moved County	0.33	0.47	0.31	0.46
Ň	89,507		473,977	

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of SNAP Enrollees in September 2013

Note: Table reports descriptive statistics of SNAP enrollees from September 2013. The top panel shows demographic data from DSS records, with the exception of the bottom two rows showing earnings and employment from UI records. Some College+ refers to educational attainment of some college or higher (college graduate or advanced degree). The bottom panel reports the fraction of people enrolled in September 2013 who had the designated indicator at any point since the start of the sample period (January 2007).

While benefit amounts are not included in our data, information from other sources indicates that SNAP benefits constitute a large and important source of income for this population. We use SNAP Quality Control (QC) data to tabulate the amount of benefits at stake and how much would be reduced through changes in program participation and labor supply.²³ If work requirements remove participants from SNAP without increasing

 $^{^{23}}$ We restrict the QC data to non-disabled adults aged 18–49 in childless households who have at least one

labor supply, the average household exiting the program would lose \$189 per month.²⁴ This drop constitutes roughly two-thirds of their gross income. If work requirements induce ABAWDs to work more to retain benefits, then SNAP benefits would decline by about \$100, on average, based on their deductions, hours, and phase-out schedule. We estimate that less than 5 percent of ABAWDs would earn enough by meeting work requirements to become ineligible for SNAP. These tabulations indicate that ABAWDs face the prospect of meaningful reductions in SNAP benefits as a result of the policy.

3 Effects on Program Participation

This section estimates the effect of work requirements on total SNAP participation. Section 3.1 documents trends of lower retention and falling total SNAP participation in the wake of work requirements. Section 3.2 then implements RDs to estimate the effect of work requirements on participation. Section 3.3 shows that slow-downs in the flow of new entrants account for a small minority of the total participation drop. Hence, reduced participation is driven primarily by exit among existing participants and shorter spells among new entrants.

3.1 Falling Participation

We begin by showing the acceleration of exit from SNAP when participants are confronted with work requirements. We use wide age ranges for these descriptive analyses, before subsequently focusing on narrower bandwidths around age 50 in the RD. The survival plot in Figure 1a shows the fraction of able-bodied adults who continue to be on SNAP for up to thirteen months after the start of their participation spell. The plot subsets to ABAWDs younger than 50, and adults 50 and older who would meet the criteria for ABAWD if not for their age.²⁵ We also restrict attention to SNAP participants who first enter after the reinstatement of statewide work requirements between October 2013 and April 2014. For the first six months after entry, none of these participants are required to work in order to continue to receive SNAP benefits. Each month, a small fraction of participants leave SNAP for other reasons (e.g., income rising above the threshold) in equal proportions across the under-50 (dashed line with circles) and 50-and-above (solid line with triangles) groups.

After six months, those under 50 years old must demonstrate that they meet work

member of the household who is not excluded from work registration, and who live in Virginia.

²⁴The maximum benefit amount for a single-person household declined from \$200 to \$189 per month immediately following the reinstatement of work requirements, contemporaneously with the expiry of ARRA benefits expansions.

²⁵The under-50 group excludes 49-year olds because they will pass the age-50 cutoff within the year.

requirements or be removed from program rolls.²⁶ While participation survival declines in both groups after six months due to reporting requirements (Gray 2019, Homonoff and Somerville 2019), the decline among those under 50 is much larger than the the corresponding decline for those 50 or older.²⁷ By month seven, the surviving fraction of ABAWDs is more than 30 percentage points (over 40 percent) smaller than the surviving fraction of ablebodied adults aged 50 and older. Since the sample consists of SNAP participants who enter the program at different times over the course of several months, the sharp decline we observe among ABAWDs after six months is not explained by a common calendar-time shock.

The sharp drop tracks subsequent policy changes. Figure 1b repeats the survival plot for later program entrants, those newly entering between July 2014 and December 2014, when the under-50 group was required to meet work requirements after only four months rather than after six months.²⁸ The figure shows a remarkably similar pattern to Figure 1a, with nearly identical survival curves for the under-50 and 50-and-above groups during the first four months, and then a sharp divergence after the under-50 group must meet work requirements. As a placebo test, Appendix Figure C.1 plots corresponding survival curves for the subset of counties that received exemptions from ABAWD work requirements in May 2014. Participation differs little by age when work requirements are not in effect. Taken together, these survival curves strongly suggest that work requirements reduced retention among new ABAWDs by substantial amounts.

Next, we document the magnitude of total participation declines following the reintroduction of work requirements. Figure 2a shows the total monthly participation counts before and after the reinstatement of work requirements (dashed red vertical line), comparing beneficiaries slightly younger than 50 (dashed line) to those 50 and slightly older (solid line). Across age groups, the participation increase that followed the Great Recession began to flatten and decline after 2012. After the reinstatement of work requirements, participation fell sharply among the under-50 group. Participation declines were much slower among those over 50, likely due to the gradual economic recovery.

While our main RD identification strategy used in the next section estimates local average treatment effects for 50-year-old SNAP participants, Figure 2b suggests that the

 $^{^{26}}$ In addition, at the six-month mark, both groups have some reporting requirements. Those that are 50 or older would typically recertify after 12 months but have a lighter reporting requirement midway through their certification period. Those that are under 50 are required to recertify after 6 months.

 $^{^{27}}$ The sharper drop between the months we label as 6 and 7 than between the months we label as 5 and 6 is attributable to imperfect measurement. Because we only observe the month of initial entry, rather than the precise date, some of the participants in the plot do not actually face binding work requirements until the month we label as month 7.

²⁸The change from six to four months was a result of Virginia discontinuing use of its 15 percent exemptions, described in Section 2, in October 2014.



(b) Participants With Four-Month Recertification Periods

Notes: Figure plots participation survival for ABAWDs aged 42–49 and able-bodied adults without dependents or disabilities aged 50–56 in counties with active work requirements, and who have not had a SNAP spell earlier in our sample period. Work requirements apply to ABAWDs (dashed line), who are required to start meeting them six months (top panel) or four months (bottom panel) after initial entry (dashed red vertical line) in order to continue to receive SNAP benefits. The top panel plots participation survival for participants whose SNAP spells begin between October 2013 and April 2014, prior to the change from six months to four months. The bottom panel plots it for those whose SNAP spells begin between July 2014 and December 2014, after the change to four months is fully in effect.



Figure 2: Total Participation Around Work Requirements

(b) Total Participation Counts (Normalized), By Age Group

Notes: Plots of monthly total participation counts in Virginia, for adults in the specified age ranges who would meet the definition for ABAWD if age were ignored. The dashed red vertical line corresponds to the end of the statewide ARRA exemptions from work requirements in September 2013. Top panel plots raw counts for age groups immediately surrounding age 50. Bottom panel plots counts for a wider range of age groups, normalized to within-group participation in September 2013.

effects we document may be generalizable to a broad range of ages. The figure plots participation counts for 5-year age bins, as a percentage of the corresponding age bin's count in September 2013 (just prior to the reinstatement of work requirements). While the groups aged 50 and above experience slow and heterogeneous declines in participation, all age ranges from 20 to 49 experience nearly identical relative declines in participation. The patterns in Figure 2b therefore suggest that the impact of work requirements is likely fairly stable across the age distribution.

3.2 Estimates of Total Participation Impact

Section 3.1 shows that SNAP participation dropped differentially among participants subject to work requirements when work requirements were reinstated. However, potential underlying differences between the under-50 and 50-and-above groups in the figure make it difficult to draw conclusions about the portion of the differential drop, if any, that is *caused* by work requirements. To obtain a credible point estimate for the causal impact of work requirements on total participation, we exploit the sharp discontinuity in ABAWD classification at age 50 using a regression discontinuity framework.

We first estimate the impact of work requirements on total participation counts for the entire state of Virginia. Our preferred RD specification is a local linear model, with age (the running variable) centered around 50:²⁹

$$Y_a = \alpha + \beta \cdot U50_a + \gamma \cdot (age_a - 50) + \delta \cdot U50_a \cdot (age_a - 50) + \varepsilon_a \tag{1}$$

where Y_a is the count of participants aged a, incremented in months. The variable $U50_a$ is an indicator for whether age a is strictly below 50, and therefore marks the age range where work requirements apply. The coefficient of interest is β , which measures the jump in the regression function at the discontinuity.³⁰

The primary specification estimates the model for participation counts eighteen months after the reinstatement of work requirements. This allows enough time to capture the entirety of the gradual roll-out of work requirements (described in Section 2.3). In evaluating outcomes at eighteen months, we exclude a donut of SNAP participants who are older than 48.5 and younger than 50 as of September 2013. As shown in Figure 3a, these participants cross the work requirements age cutoff between September 2013 and the period when outcomes are measured, and are therefore only partially exposed to work

 $^{^{29}}$ We follow Gelman and Imbens (2017) in using low-order polynomial specifications. Appendix C checks robustness to alternative specifications.

³⁰Participation counts include only the 110 counties in which work requirements remain on after their reinstatement; the 23 counties that later regain exemptions are excluded.

requirements. This age-out during the period between the policy change and the outcome measurement motivates the donut RD approach used throughout the paper. In order to avoid ad hoc bandwidth selection for the RDs, we follow the systematic procedure of Calonico et al. (2014) to select (potentially asymmetric) optimal bandwidths. Appendix Figure C.7 shows that our conclusions remain similar over a wide range of bandwidths.

Figure 3b displays the results of the total participation RD. The regression is estimated using granular one-month age bins. The sharp positive increase in participation at age 50 suggests that, eighteen months after reinstatement, work requirements reduce total ABAWD participation by 52 percent. This drop is calculated as the reduction within each monthly age bin (108 participants), compared to the number of participants at age 50 (205 participants).³¹

Appendix Figure C.2 provides further evidence that the participation reduction is caused by work requirements. The figure shows the total participation RDs estimated at earlier periods: 12 months before the reinstatement of work requirements, the month that work requirements were reinstated, and 12 months after the reinstatement of work requirements. In each RD, we define the excluded donut to correspond to those participants whose exposure to work requirements changes between the estimation period and the post-ARRA reintroduction of work requirements.³² The periods before and at the reinstatement serve as placebo checks: participation on either side of the age 50 threshold is nearly identical, suggesting that the jump in Figure 3b is *not* attributable to discontinuities at age 50 that are present when work requirements shows a similar pattern to Figure 3b, but the participation drop below age 50 is smaller, consistent with the gradual roll-out of the policy. As a robustness check, Appendix Figure C.3 plots the RD estimates for a wide array of time horizons using linear and quadratic specifications.

3.3 Retention vs. Deterrence

Section 3.2 provides compelling evidence of a causal effect of work requirements on total SNAP participation. This section conceptually clarifies how this decline may occur through three distinct channels:

1. Deterrence of potential new enrollees.

³¹We assume that leniency in the classification of "able-bodied" remains the same after the policy. If we define ABAWDs based only on age and dependents, we estimate a drop of -103.1 cases at age 50. As this magnitude is very close to the -107.6 estimate from Figure 3b, we conclude that such reclassification is likely negligible.

³²The earlier periods do not require a donut; the period 12 months after the reinstatement of work requirements requires a one-year age donut.

Figure 3: Exposure to Work Requirements and RD Estimate of Total Participation



(a) Exposure to Work Requirements by Age at Start of Work Requirements



(b) RD Estimate of Total SNAP Participation, 18 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Top panel shows the fraction of time that SNAP participants are subject to work requirements during the 18 months immediately following the reintroduction of work requirements. Work requirements abruptly cease to apply at age 50. Participants whose age when work requirements start is between 48.5 and 50 fall into the "donut" of those who age out by the time outcomes are measured (18 months after the reintroduction of work requirements). Bottom panel displays the RD results for total SNAP participation 18 months after work requirements were reinstated in Virginia. The scatter plot shows total participant counts by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of the subset of counties for which work requirements remain on after October 2013.

- 2. Decreased retention among new enrollees.
- 3. Decreased retention among existing participants.

We perform a series of rough exercises to approximate the relative magnitude of each channel in explaining the overall participation decline. Note that Figure 3b estimates a missing mass of 108 beneficiaries per monthly age bin just below age 50. We produce RD estimates for each of the three channels above and compare them to this missing mass.

In two different exercises, the first channel—deterrence of potential new enrollees—appears to explain only a small fraction of the total enrollment decline. First, Figure 4 plots monthly new entrant counts. There is no clear trend break in the flow of new entrants following the reintroduction of statewide work requirements. Instead, the flow of new entrants under 50 decreases at a steady rate starting in 2011. Alternatively, we estimate (noisy) RDs of total new enrollment in each month from October 2013 through March 2015, and sum the corresponding enrollment drops together. Appendix Figure C.4 shows these coefficients. The coefficients sum to -18, suggesting that new enrollment decline.³³

The second channel—decreased retention among new enrollees—is difficult to estimate credibly given the possible selection of unobservably different beneficiaries into the program over time. As a very rough approximation, we estimate the loss in retention among new enrollees by estimating separate RDs around age 50 for each subsequent monthly cohort of new entrants after September 2013.³⁴ Point estimates are shown in Appendix Figure C.5. Multiplying each coefficient by the number of new 50-year-old enrollees in each month yields a sum of -16, suggesting a modest role for new beneficiary retention of around 15 percent (16/108).

Finally, we multiply the number of 50 year olds on the program in September 2013 (214) by the retention effect calculated later in the paper (-0.238) and conclude that 51 participating individuals per monthly age bin exited due to work requirements. This suggests that the third channel—retention among existing participants—can explain 47 percent (51/108) of the total enrollment decline.³⁵

These exercises are imperfect but are nonetheless useful. Namely, they provide evidence that deterrence is *not* the primary driver of enrollment declines. Instead, retention of existing and new beneficiaries appear to be the most important channels in total enrollment declines.

 $^{^{33}}$ We would ideally examine take-up among those *eligible* for SNAP rather than those newly enrolling, but we have no reason to believe this should jump discontinuously at age 50.

 $^{^{34}}$ We adjust the donut in each RD to exclude those under 50 who turn 50 before March 2015.

³⁵The decomposition into channels need not necessary sum to 100 percent because each channel's contribution is estimated using a separate RD. The sum of the RD estimates is not mechanically equal to the RD on total participation.

Figure 4: New SNAP Entry Around Work Requirements



Notes: Plot of monthly counts of new entrants in Virginia, for adults in the specified age ranges who would meet the definition for ABAWD if age were ignored. Points represent month-deseasonalized, mean-preserving new entrant counts. The dashed red vertical line corresponds to the end of the statewide ARRA exemptions from work requirements in September 2013.

4 Effects on Participant Exit

This section estimates the effect of introducing work requirements on the retention of existing beneficiaries. The regressions are estimated on our "stock" population of childless adults who were participating in SNAP as of September 2013, just before the reinstatement of work requirements. The stock population has three attractive features. First, it defines the sample prior to the reinstatement of work requirements, thereby avoiding selection issues arising from nonrandom work requirement-induced deterrence of entry into SNAP. Second, it better limits the analyzed population to those who are likely to be impacted by SNAP policy changes, bringing the estimate closer to treatment-on-the-treated than studies that use cross-sectional survey data. Third, it allows us to study the heterogeneity of work requirements in which work requirements remained in force for two or more years after their reinstatement, which covers 70.7 percent of the full stock sample. This sample definition allows us to measure outcomes for all participants after the same elapsed time since the reinstatement of work requirements. This is our main sample for the remainder of the paper.

As before, our preferred RD specification is a local linear model, with age centered

around 50:

$$1(Enrolled)_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot U50_i + \gamma \cdot (age_i - 50) + \delta \cdot U50_i \cdot (age_i - 50) + \eta \cdot X_i + \varepsilon_i$$
(2)

where $1(Enrolled)_i$ is our outcome of interest for individual *i* in a predetermined future month. The vector X_i includes a handful of individual-level controls to increase precision; point estimates are very similar with or without controls.³⁶ The coefficient of interest is β , which measures the jump in the regression function at the discontinuity. We begin by running these regressions on our stock population, and examine outcomes after the October 2013 reinstatement of work requirements.

As before, our main specifications measure participation eighteen months after work requirements resume (March 2015), with an excluded donut of SNAP participants who are only partially exposed to work requirements between September 2013 and March 2015 (see Figure 3a). Standard errors are clustered by monthly age (the discrete running variable). Again, our main results use MSE-optimal bandwidths determined by the method in Calonico et al. (2014).

4.1 Identification Assumptions

The identification assumptions for these RD regressions of participant exit are analogous to the assumptions required for the labor market outcomes RD regressions in Section 5. We therefore discuss both together here. The key identification assumption of the RD is that the potential outcomes would have evolved smoothly through the excluded donut in the absence of the treatment that starts at age 50. This assumption is more demanding than the standard RD assumption that the potential outcomes would have been smooth at the age 50 cutoff that determined treatment.

We perform a battery of checks to validate the research design. First, we test for balance in covariates at the discontinuity by replacing $1(Enrolled)_i$ with each of our demographic controls. Table 2 shows there are rarely differences across the threshold: the magnitudes of the differences are generally small and only one out of seventeen is statistically significant. Second, we verify that the density of the age distribution is smooth at the discontinuity. Appendix Figure C.8 shows there is no visual evidence of sorting around the cutoff. We fail

³⁶The baseline specification includes indicators for female, married, homelessness, any earned income, any unearned income, and some college according to DSS records. It also includes categorical variables for race and linear controls for case size from the SNAP records, pre-period wage earnings, and the fraction of months with employment in the pre-period from the UI records. The pre-period in this case includes all data back to the beginning of our sample window (January 2007). Other controls are taken as snapshots in September 2013.

to reject the null hypothesis of continuity in the density at age 50 based on the manipulation tests in Frandsen (2017), which adapts the standard density tests for a discrete running variable (McCrary 2008, Cattaneo et al. 2018). Finally, we re-estimate the RDs using as a placebo the ARRA time period when work requirements were not in effect for any group. We find no "effect" of the age 50 threshold on enrollment or employment in the placebo period (Figures 5b, 6b, and 7b). We also estimate these regressions in the placebo period without excluding ages in the donut to check for violations of the donut RD assumption, and find precisely estimated zeros, as in the main placebo regressions.³⁷ These checks support the identifying assumptions required for the validity of the research design.

	Discontinuity	S.E.	Control Mean	% diff	N
Female	0.020	0.026	0.457	4.5	8,123
White	-0.009	0.025	0.409	-2.1	$7,\!902$
Black	-0.004	0.026	0.519	-0.8	$7,\!409$
Married	0.035	0.014	0.075	46.7	$9,\!385$
Household Size	-0.006	0.029	1.284	-0.5	$7,\!554$
Household Head	-0.006	0.009	0.941	-0.7	$7,\!308$
Homeless	-0.007	0.018	0.147	-4.8	$8,\!350$
High School	0.018	0.024	0.541	3.3	9,000
Some College or Higher	-0.015	0.015	0.098	-15.4	$9,\!541$
Has Earned Income	-0.011	0.012	0.186	-6.0	8,131
Has Unearned Income	0.013	0.012	0.087	15.2	10,332
Earned or Unearned Income	-0.004	0.014	0.266	-1.4	$9,\!570$
Fraction of Months Employed (7yr avg)	0.008	0.011	0.311	2.6	7,369
Avg. Annual Earnings (7yr avg)	298.432	194.442	4466.207	6.7	9,800
Fraction of Months Employed (3yr avg)	-0.001	0.013	0.288	-0.5	$6,\!480$
Avg. Annual Earnings (3yr avg)	298.790	221.707	3635.817	8.2	$8,\!908$
Unemployment Rate	0.041	0.064	7.394	0.6	8,738

Table 2: Covariate Balance in RD

Notes: Table presents balance tests of covariates at SNAP enrollment using our "stock" sample. Each row corresponds to a separate regression with that characteristic as the dependent variable. The discontinuity measures the jump in the regression function at age 50. Standard errors are clustered by monthly age (the running variable). The Control Mean denotes the mean of that characteristic immediately to the right of age 50. Each regression uses MSE-optimal bandwidths calculated separately for each side of the cutoff and for each outcome, and a uniform kernel to weight observations. Sample sizes vary depending on the bandwidth used.

 $^{^{37}}$ The key coefficient of interest (standard error) in the placebo period is 0.003 (0.020) excluding observations the donut and 0.008 (0.014) otherwise for the enrollment outcome. For the employment outcome, the corresponding coefficient is 0.005 (0.011) excluding the donut and 0.003 (0.009) otherwise. For the earnings outcome, the corresponding coefficient is 31.180 (23.034) and 7.769 (17.533) otherwise. All of these are small relative to their respective means reported in Table 5.

4.2 Estimates of Participant Exit

Figure 5a displays our main RD results. The figure displays a fitted regression as well as average retention percentages, which are collapsed to quarters for readability. The sharp positive increase in participation at age 50 suggests that work requirements reduce ABAWD participation by a statistically significant 24 percentage points. This represents a 38 percent decline from the mean among participants aged 50.³⁸ As further evidence that this decline is a result of work requirements, Figure 5b replicates the specification using data from the statewide ARRA exemption period between 2011 and 2013, when all participants were exempt from work requirements. This placebo regression uses an analogous "stock" sample of participants enrolled in September 2011 and measures outcomes in March 2013, matching the calendar months of our main stock sample to address seasonality. There is no statistically or economically significant difference in participation across the age 50 cutoff during this placebo period.

Appendix Figure C.6 traces out the RD results for participation where outcomes are measured at alternative time periods, ranging from 1 to 27 months following the reinstatement of work requirements. The effect begins to appear in the seventh month after work requirements resume, which is the first month that we should expect SNAP participants to be disenrolled if they are not meeting the requirements. The participation drop reaches 24 percentage points within roughly eighteen months and then remains at that level, consistent with the disenrollment schedule described in Section 2.3.

Program exit due to work requirement policy can occur through at least two distinct channels, which we decompose here. First, SNAP participants may exit as a result of failure or unwillingness to work or perform other qualifying activities. Second, participants may exit due to a more demanding recertification schedule, given the 4- to 6-month grace period associated with Virginia's policy. We can isolate the first channel by looking only at a subset of stock population participants who share the same recertification burdens regardless of age. Specifically, all participants under 50 must complete two recertifications in the 18 months between September 2013 and March 2015. Participants 50 and older with initial enrollment between October and March also face two recertifications over this period. Yet participants over 50 whose enrollment spells began between April and September must only complete *one* recertification in the 18 months following September 2013. This variation in recertifications requirements by month applies irrespective of the year in which the enrollment spell begins.³⁹

³⁸Recall that there is some natural attrition in participation, as shown in Figure 1a.

³⁹To better understand this variation, consider two 50-year-old non-working beneficiaries with recertifications due in March and April, respectively. The March recertifier must submit paperwork in March 2014 and March 2015 while the April recertifier must submit paperwork in April 2014 and April 2015, which is 1 month past the 18-month window. By the time we assess retention in March 2015, the March



Figure 5: RD Estimates of SNAP Retention, 18 Months After Work Requirements

(b) Placebo Test: Participation During ARRA Exemptions

Notes: Panel (a) visually displays the RD results for SNAP participation after eighteen months of work requirements. The scatter plot shows covariate-adjusted means by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit in months on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties for which work requirements remain on after October 2013. As a placebo test, Panel (b) replicates the analysis among those enrolled in September 2011 and measures enrollment in March 2013, over which period no work requirements were in effect.

To only compare participants with two recertifications, Appendix Figure C.9 shows the RD estimate only for those in the stock population who have scheduled recertifications in the months of September 2013 through March 2015. The RD estimate of 26.4 percentage points is not statistically distinguishable from the main estimate of 23.8 percentage points in this section. This confirms that the failure to meet work requirements, and not the extra recertification associated with work requirements in Virginia, is the primary driver of our results.

4.3 Heterogeneous and Screening Effects of Work Requirements

Section 4.2 documents that work requirements lead to substantial exit from SNAP. This section examines *who* exits from SNAP as a result of work requirements using two alternative measures. The first assesses how the *sensitivity* of participants to work requirements varies across participants with differing characteristics. The second examines how work requirements impact the overall *composition* of SNAP participants.

First, to assess whether participants with certain characteristics are more sensitive to work requirements, we fully interact the standard RD specification with an indicator for observable binary characteristic x:

$$1(Enrolled)_{i} = \alpha_{1} + \alpha_{2}x_{i} + \beta_{1}U50_{i} + \beta_{2}U50_{i} \cdot x_{i} + \gamma_{1}(age_{i} - 50) + \gamma_{2}(age_{i} - 50) \cdot x_{i} + \delta_{1}(age_{i} - 50) \cdot U50_{i} + \delta_{2}(age_{i} - 50) \cdot U50 \cdot x_{i} + \varepsilon_{i}$$
(3)

where $1(Enrolled)_i$ represents participation in SNAP of individual *i* from our stock population eighteen months after the reinstatement of work requirements. Observable characteristics *x* include several of the demographic variables previously introduced in the text and variables indicating above-median time spent on SNAP (either over the lifetime of individuals as captured in our data or in their most recent spells). To create a single measure of how these different characteristics map to earnings, we predict earnings from a regression of 2013Q3 earnings against these variables. We include an indicator for being above the median of predicted earnings as a summary metric of economic vulnerability. α_1 estimates the SNAP program eighteen-month retention rate for those *without* characteristic x. β_1 estimates the corresponding impact of work requirements on this retention rate in percentage points. The new coefficient β_2 estimates how much larger the discontinuity is for those with a given characteristic $(x_i = 1)$, as a percent of all members of the "stock"

recertifier must have submitted two rounds of paperwork, while the April recertifier must have submitted one.

population with that characteristic.

However, certain characteristics may correlate with higher or lower retention even absent work requirements, making the intuitive meaning of β_2 less clear. In order to construct more meaningful parameters, we scale the effect of work requirements on retention among those with $x_i = 0$ by the baseline retention rate absent work requirements $\left(\frac{\beta_1}{\alpha_1}\right)$. We then perform the analogous scaling for those with $x_i = 1$ as $\left(\frac{\beta_1 + \beta_2}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}\right)$. These numbers capture the fraction of participants who left the program due to work requirements out of those who would have been on the program absent work requirements. They therefore have a more intuitive interpretation as the sensitivity of participants to work requirements.

Estimates of β_2 , $\left(\frac{\beta_1}{\alpha_1}\right)$ and $\left(\frac{\beta_1 + \beta_2}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}\right)$ are reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3, respectively. Each row in Table 3 refers to estimates from a separate regression corresponding to a different characteristic x. We use the delta method to evaluate whether $\left(\frac{\beta_1}{\alpha_1}\right)$ and $\left(\frac{\beta_1 + \beta_2}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}\right)$ are statistically different, and report the p-value in column 4. Greater sensitivity to work requirements among the group with characteristic x in comparison to the group without characteristic x is indicated by a negative and statistically significant estimate of β_2 (column 1), or a larger negative value of $\left(\frac{\beta_1 + \beta_2}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}\right)$ (column 3) compared to $\left(\frac{\beta_1}{\alpha_1}\right)$ (column 2) and a statistically significant p-value (column 4). We find that work requirements have disproportionately larger impacts on participants who are homeless and participants without earned or unearned income at the time of their SNAP application. On the other hand, those who have a history of reporting a disability are less likely to be impacted by work requirements. This group may be more likely to be reclassified as exempt from work requirements due to not meeting the definition for able-bodied (see Section 5.1). Overall, we find that those with lower baseline predicted earnings based on their characteristics are disproportionately impacted by work requirements.

Our second screening measure describes how the composition of retained participants is affected by work requirements. This measure captures changes due to work requirements in the characteristics of the population of SNAP participants, rather than the differential group-specific exit sensitivities captured by our first measure. Results may differ from those using the first measure when the number of people with a given characteristic is small. In this case, even large sensitivities may translate to very small compositional changes in the pool of SNAP participants.

To operationalize the compositional measure, we ask which observable characteristics are disproportionately represented among retained participants under work requirements

	β_2	β_1/α_1	$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	<i>p</i> -value
			$\overline{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}$	of difference
Above Median Predicted Earnings	0.067	-0.418	-0.356	0.097
	(0.028)			
Female	0.069	-0.456	-0.329	0.007
	(0.036)			
Married	0.065	-0.404	-0.316	0.315
	(0.060)			
Homeless	-0.142	-0.365	-0.566	0.001
	(0.041)			
White	0.036	-0.415	-0.366	0.244
	(0.027)			
Black	-0.050	-0.378	-0.418	0.426
	(0.035)			
Some College+	0.005	-0.393	-0.433	0.607
	(0.054)			
Has Earned Income	0.103	-0.422	-0.272	0.006
	(0.037)			
Has Unearned Income	0.098	-0.409	-0.263	0.071
	(0.058)			
Ever Before UI Recipient	0.042	-0.403	-0.369	0.568
	(0.046)			
Ever Before Disability	0.213	-0.487	-0.103	0.000
	(0.039)			
Above Median Unemployment Rate	-0.020	-0.394	-0.400	0.882
	(0.030)			
Above Median Previous Time on SNAP	-0.079	-0.399	-0.400	0.980
	(0.033)			
Above Median Previous SNAP Spell	-0.110	-0.361	-0.412	0.286
	(0.032)			

Table 3: Sensitivity RD, 18 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Table presents RD estimates of Equation 3. Each row presents results from a separate regression corresponding to the characteristic listed. N = 17,438. Separate MSE-optimal bandwidths calculated on each side of the donut. The column β_2 presents the differential jump at age 50 for people with the characteristic relative to those without. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The second column reports the retention of people without the characteristic, calculated as β_1/α_1 . The third column reports retention for those with the characteristic, calculated as $(\beta_1 + \beta_2)/(\alpha + \alpha_2)$. The *p*-value from the test that columns 2 and 3 are equal is reported in the last column, calculated using the delta method.

relative to the counterfactual without work requirements. Table 4 reports estimates from RD regressions on the proportion of cases with characteristics x among the set of all cases that remain on SNAP in March 2015:

$$x_{i} = \alpha_{1} + \theta_{1}U50_{i} + \gamma_{1}(age_{i} - 50) + \gamma_{2}(age_{i} - 50) \cdot U50_{i} + \varepsilon_{i}$$
(4)

In this regression, the coefficient of interest is θ_1 , which represents the change in composition of retained cases across the age 50 cutoff. Table 4 shows that, similar to the findings in Table 3, work requirements reduce the proportion of homeless individuals, individuals with no earned income and individuals with below-median predicted earnings among those who remain on SNAP. Also similarly to the findings in Table 3, work requirements cause a greater proportion of those who remain on SNAP to be composed of those who have a documented history of having a disability. Overall, the results suggest that work requirements disproportionately impact beneficiaries with characteristics suggesting greater economic vulnerability, while disproportionately exempting those with a history of disability.

5 Effects on Labor Market Outcomes

This section estimates the effect of work requirements on individual-level labor market outcomes using the stock population and regression specification described in Section 4. We first present estimates of the effects on employment, wage earnings, and other labor market outcomes. We then conduct robustness checks for both the employment and earnings estimates. Finally, we estimate RDs on quantiles of the earnings distribution to examine heterogeneity in the labor market impacts of work requirements.

5.1 Estimates of Labor Market Effects

Section 3.2 documents the large participation drops due to work requirements. In contrast, this section shows that the average effects on employment and earnings are not statistically different from zero. Figure 6 shows the RD results with an indicator for employment as the dependent variable, defined as having any UI-covered earnings six quarters after work requirements were reinstated. We fail to detect a statistically significant impact of work requirements on employment on average, and we statistically reject employment increases larger than 2.0 percentage points. To test robustness, Appendix Figure C.10 defines the

	Discontinuity	SE	Control Mean	% Diff
Above Median Predicted Earnings	0.048	0.025	0.348	13.8
Female	0.056	0.036	0.462	12.2
Married	0.025	0.019	0.100	24.6
Homeless	-0.040	0.017	0.146	-27.7
White	0.003	0.026	0.401	0.7
Black	-0.004	0.031	0.456	-0.9
Some College+	-0.031	0.020	0.099	-31.7
Has Earned Income	0.050	0.015	0.157	32.0
Has Unearned Income	0.022	0.016	0.087	25.1
Ever Before UI Recipient	0.003	0.021	0.214	1.3
Ever Before Disability	0.161	0.024	0.173	92.8
Above Median Unemployment Rate	-0.032	0.034	0.422	-7.5
Above Median Previous Time on SNAP	0.008	0.032	0.620	1.2
Above Median Previous SNAP Spell	-0.001	0.030	0.651	-0.1

Table 4: Screening RD by Subgroup, 18 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Table presents RD estimates of Equation 4. Each row presents results from a separate regression corresponding to the characteristic listed. The first column presents the estimate on the indicator for under 50. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses are presented in the second column. The third column presents the percentage of 50-year olds who exited SNAP by March 2015 and have the characteristic listed as of September 2013. The last column presents the discontinuity as a percentage of the control mean. The unemployment rate is measured as the county average of the period between October 2013 and March 2015.

dependent variable as the union of having a wage in the UI data or reporting earned income to the SNAP agency. This allows us to capture possible effects on self-employment, under the assumption that work requirements only induce additional self-employment if the affected individuals remain on SNAP. The point estimates are nearly identical and still not statistically different from zero.⁴⁰

A potential explanation for this null result is that many SNAP participants have very low labor force attachment, making employment responses unlikely and diluting the average estimate. We further investigate this null result in Appendix Table C.4, which shows our primary specification using individuals with greater or lesser labor force attachment. To measure labor force attachment, we predict UI-covered employment in 2013Q3 with LASSO regression, using a large set of demographic covariates.⁴¹ In predicting employment probabilities, we randomly divide the sample into fifths and use data from four-fifths to fit a model to predict employment in the remaining fifth. Work requirements do not clearly increase UI-covered employment even for individuals with moderate or strong pre-existing attachment to the labor force.

We then assess whether UI-covered earnings change at the age 50 cutoff. Figure 7a shows no statistically significant impact on average earnings. However, the estimate is somewhat imprecise, and we are unable to statistically rule out increases of up to \$31 per month. Appendix Figure C.11a shows qualitatively similar results for log earnings. We also find imprecise estimates by different levels of labor force attachment, as shown in Appendix Table C.4.

As a notable aside, Appendix Figure C.12 defines the dependent variable as an indicator for whether the participant remained on SNAP with a known exemption (other than an age-based exemption). This captures the extent to which ABAWDs were able to claim new exemptions (e.g., disability) or alter their household structure (e.g., by claiming new dependents) in response to work requirements. There does appear to be some impact: an additional 5.7 percent of the stock sample is able to stay on the program by claiming a new exemption. However, this magnitude is small relative to the 23.8 percent of the stock sample who lose benefits as a result of work requirements.

Table 5 collects the point estimates and standard errors from these specifications.

⁴⁰Furthermore, the donut RD may overstate any employment effect if younger SNAP recipients exit SNAP more quickly than older recipients due to the improving economy. The time series patterns by age in Figure 2a suggests this possibility, which reinforces our interpretation of a very small average employment effect.

⁴¹Specifically, we use data-dependent penalization methods based on Belloni et al. (2012). The regression includes the following controls to predict employment: indicators for yearly age, indicators for earnings in each month of the previous 7 years prior to Sept. 2013, household size, and indicators for gender, married, private living arrangement, white, black, some college or higher education, reporting earned income on the SNAP application, and reporting unearned income on the SNAP application.





(b) Placebo Test: Employment During ARRA Exemptions

Notes: Panel (a) visually displays the RD results for employment after eighteen months of work requirements. The scatter plot shows covariate-adjusted means by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit in months on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties where work requirements remain on after October 2013. Panel (b) replicates the same analysis among those enrolled in September 2011, when the ARRA exemption that suspended work requirements was in effect for an additional two years.



Figure 7: RD Estimates of Earnings, 18 Months After Work Requirements

(b) Placebo Test: Earnings During ARRA Exemptions

Notes: Panel (a) visually displays the RD results for earnings (including zeros) after eighteen months of work requirements. Earnings are top-coded at the 99th percentile within yearly age bins for each calendar month. The scatter plot shows covariate-adjusted means by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit in months on both sides of the eligibility threshold. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties where work requirements remain on after October 2013. Panel (b) replicates the same analysis among those participating in September 2011, when the ARRA exemption that suspended work requirements was in effect for an additional two years.

Below the coefficient estimates, we report the mean of each corresponding outcome variable at age 50 (immediately to the right of the RD threshold). For the two outcomes where we find statistically significant effects in our main stock sample, the estimate from the placebo period is a precisely estimated zero. Overall, the findings suggest that work requirements do not increase labor force attachment by a meaningful amount on average eighteen months after their reinstatement. The upper bound of our 95 percent confidence interval on employment is 2.1 percentage points. For wage outcomes, point estimates suggest a small or zero impact but are less precise.

A number of robustness checks in Appendix A also fail to find strong evidence of employment effects. Appendix Figure C.7 shows robustness to alternative bandwidth choices for employment and earnings, using a symmetric bandwidth on both sides of the cutoff. Appendix Figure C.13 presents estimates for other durations ranging from 1 to 27 months after work requirements. We also obtain similar estimates if we use triangular kernels instead of a uniform kernel to weight observations (Appendix Table C.2). We reproduce Table 5 without covariates in Appendix Table C.3. The estimates on employment and earnings are slightly higher, but still not close to statistical significance. Appendix Figure C.14 plots these estimates over time to examine robustness to the choice of duration. While there are signs of an upward trend in both employment and earnings, none of the estimates are statistically significant and they remain within the confidence intervals for models with controls (Appendix Figure C.13). Collectively, these results reinforce that our findings are consistent with zero or moderate average impacts on employment or earnings.

5.2 Heterogeneity of Labor Market Effects

The RD regressions in Section 5.1 fail to detect a statistically significant impact of work requirements on labor market outcomes on average. In this section, we examine the heterogeneity of the effect of work requirements on earnings. It may simultaneously be true that work requirements induce no change in earnings among the majority of participants who are far from the threshold—either because they are so far below it that meeting it would be too difficult or because they would be above it even in the absence of work requirements—and induce a substantial change in earnings among individuals near the cutoff. In such a case, the average effect of work requirements may be statistically indistinguishable from zero despite the existence of a subgroup of participants for whom the effect is positive.

To examine the heterogeneity of the effects, we estimate unconditional quantile regressions using the recentered influence function method (Firpo et al. 2009). For the qth
	Main Stock	Placebo Stock
	(September 2013)	(ARRA Period)
Panel A. SNAP Participation		
Discontinuity	-0.238	0.003
	(0.015)	(0.020)
Control Mean	0.631	0.664
N	$15,\!675$	$13,\!438$
Panel B. Employment		
Discontinuity	-0.007	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.011)
Control Mean	0.290	0.278
N	$18,\!919$	$20,\!651$
Panel C. Employed or Earned Income		
Discontinuity	-0.006	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Control Mean	0.347	0.333
N	$17,\!349$	$17,\!215$
Panel D. Earnings		
Discontinuity	-6.4	31.2
	(19.4)	(23.0)
Control Mean	356.4	342.8
N	16,027	$18,\!243$
Panel E. Log Earnings		
Discontinuity	-0.018	0.060
	(0.085)	(0.074)
Control Mean	1.909	1.873
N	$17,\!424$	20,502
Panel F. Exemption (Other than Age)		
Discontinuity	0.057	-0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Control Mean	0.096	0.114
N	$15,\!970$	$17,\!434$

Table 5: RD Estimates of Key Outcomes, 18 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Table shows regressions coefficients from local linear RD specifications with a uniform kernel, corresponding to RD figures in the text. Standard errors clustered by monthly age (the running variable) are reported in parentheses. Control mean is the predicted mean of the corresponding outcome variable immediately to the right of the age 50 threshold (the intercept with the cutoff). Employment and earnings are measured from UI records. Log earnings calculated as $\ln(y + 1)$. Earnings include those with zero UI earnings, and are winsorized at the 99 percent level by yearly age within each calendar month. The variables Earned Income and Exemption status are reported on DSS records.

quantile of the overall monthly earnings distribution, y_q , we compute that quantile in each age bin and estimate an RD of how that quantile changes at the age 50 cutoff. The regression specification excludes controls other than age and otherwise mirrors our baseline RD specification (Equation 4). The coefficient on the indicator for below age 50 in the qth regression can be interpreted as the effect of work requirements on earnings at y_q , the qth percentile of the unconditional monthly earnings distribution. By estimating the unconditional quantile effect at each percentile, we trace out the potentially heterogeneous effect along the earnings distribution. Because these unconditional quantile regressions compute the unconditional (marginal) effects across the underlying distribution of observables, they recover average impacts without needing to hold other covariates (such as age) constant.

Identification in the Firpo et al. (2009) approach relies on the assumption that treatment is exogenous conditional on observables. This is equivalent to the assumptions required for identification in our baseline RD, discussed in Section 4.1. If the RD assumptions hold, then exposure to work requirements status is fully determined by observable age and exogenous to other determinants of earnings, and no additional exogeneity assumptions are required for the unconditional quantile regressions. Note that these estimates do not allow us to identify *which* individuals shifted their behavior as a result of work requirements without stronger assumptions.⁴²

Figure 8 plots the main coefficients of interest at each percentile using the stock population, and the shaded region shows 95 percent confidence intervals. Since the RD estimate of the effect in the lower range of the distribution is mechanically zero, we only report results for the 60th percentile and above.⁴³ The vertical red line is placed between the percentiles of the earnings distribution that straddle the minimum earnings required to maintain eligibility through working, calculated as 80 times the hourly minimum wage over the period (\$7.25 per hour).

Figure 8a shows the estimates 18 months after the start of work requirements; Figure 8b shows them at 24 months. At 18 months, just after the completion of the gradual roll-out of work requirements, the estimated earnings effects are not statistically distinguishable from zero across the entire earnings distribution. This result is consistent with the estimated

 $^{^{42}}$ In other words, it is not possible to say what the counterfactual earnings would be among the people who are at a given quantile in the observed work requirements regime. The identity of the participants at the *q*th quantile generally will not remain fixed under counterfactual work requirements regimes, except under the assumption that the effect is (weakly) monotonically increasing in the original quantile, which would guarantee rank invariance. The earnings distribution among 49-year-olds stochastically dominates the distribution among 50-year-olds, which is consistent with rank invariance but cannot definitively rule out rank switching.

⁴³The bottom two-thirds of the earnings distribution on both sides of the age 50 cutoff have zero earnings.



Figure 8: Heterogeneity in RD Estimates of Earnings



(b) 24 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Figure plots coefficients from individual-level regressions of monthly earnings. Each coefficient is from a separate regression for that quantile using the recentered influence function method of Firpo et al. (2009). Top panel measures earnings in March 2015; bottom panel measures earnings in September 2015. Shading denotes 95 percent confidence intervals. For visual clarity, we omit presenting the 99th percentile because the point estimate at 18 months is very imprecise, making it difficult to discern the magnitudes of the other estimates.

null average effects of work requirements on employment and earnings in Figures 6a and 7a. Appendix Figure C.15 considers the analogous exercise for the placebo cohorts (on SNAP in September 2011). We estimate zeros along the entire earnings distribution in the placebo period at both the 18-month and 24-month intervals.

An additional six months after the completion of the roll-out, however, the estimates for the treatment period are substantively different (Figure 8b). The effect of work requirements on monthly earnings remains statistically indistinguishable from zero at the top and bottom ends of the earnings distribution. However, between the 70th and 80th percentiles of the distribution, the estimates are consistently positive and statistically significant at the 5 or 10 percent levels. With the caveats in interpreting results from quantile regressions discussed above, this pattern is consistent with a positive response among SNAP participants who are already near the work requirements threshold. The peak of the point estimates is at the 75th percentile, slightly above the minimum threshold for meeting work requirements. The increases are in the range of \$250 to \$450 per month, which is equivalent to shifting a portion of the earnings distribution to the right by three to six percentiles in the vicinity of the minimum work requirements threshold. This is a substantial increase in earnings.⁴⁴

The pattern documented in Figure 8b would imply that work requirements have a meaningful positive earnings impact in a narrow subset of the earnings distribution of SNAP participants. However, the zeros estimated just six months earlier in Figure 8a dictate caution in the interpretation of these results. Because our primary dataset ends in December 2015, we cannot check whether the positive effects documented in September 2015 (Figure 8b) are a short-term statistical anomaly or a persistent feature. However, the combination of three facts may explain this delayed response. First, it takes time for participants to find (additional) work. Second, improvements in the labor market in mid-2015 may interact with work requirements status. Third, and most relevant, participants can obtain a new 12-month recertification period by temporarily meeting the work requirements after six months. Participants who meet work requirements at the end of their initial 6-month recertification period and then stop working are not removed from SNAP until their next 12-month recertification. In the interim, they can receive several months of benefits without meeting work requirements (see Appendix A). However, a participant who reaches the maximum allowable number of months of not meeting work requirements must subsequently meet them every month to remain on SNAP. Due to this certification schedule, work requirements effectively become more stringent over time,⁴⁵

 $^{^{44}\}mathrm{By}$ comparison, in 2015, when our regression outcomes are measured, the federal poverty line for a single-person household was \$11,770, or \$981 per month.

⁴⁵Until the work requirements "clock" is reset after 36 months.

which is consistent with the observed increase in the earnings impact between Figures 8a and 8b.

A natural question is whether the earnings increases in Figure 8b are concentrated among participants who exit SNAP and work more to compensate for the loss of benefits, or among those who work more to retain SNAP eligibility. We refer to these mechanisms as an income effect and an incentive effect, respectively. Unfortunately, our RD identification strategy will not yield causal estimates for these mechanisms: examining earnings for those remaining on SNAP in September 2015, for example, involves conditioning on the (endogenous) outcome of not having exited within 24 months of work requirements.⁴⁶ Figure 8b provides suggestive evidence of a role for incentive effects, since the largest earnings increases are near the minimum threshold for meeting work requirements, but we cannot rule out strong income effects within this range.

We now attempt a more formal decomposition of income and incentive effects. We attempt to disentangle the mechanisms by classifying participants into three underlying types using machine learning techniques: "never exiters" who would remain on SNAP regardless of whether work requirements are in place, "induced exiters" who would remain on SNAP in the absence of work requirements but exit *due to* work requirements, or "always exiters" who would have exited under either policy regime.⁴⁷ RD estimates in the never exiters subsample and induced exiters subsample can then be interpreted as the incentive effect and the income effect, respectively. We use LASSO for the classification, although results are similar when using (more computationally expensive) regression trees. Appendix D describes the details regarding variable selection, classification thresholds, and bootstrapped standard errors.

Unfortunately, these results are inconclusive. The classification process substantially decreases our sample size and even sophisticated tree methods have limited predictive power. Appendix Table D.1 reports the RD estimates of labor market outcomes within the never exiters (column 1) and induced exiters (column 2). Although some of the point estimates are large, the estimates for both employment and earnings are statistically indistinguishable from zero in both groups. We therefore conclude that work requirements may appreciably increase

⁴⁶This is an example of the "bad controls" problem, as it involves conditioning on the endogenous outcome of exit. See Section 4.3 for evidence that beneficiaries who exit due to work requirements differ on observables from those who remain on SNAP.

⁴⁷We first tag never exiters by predicting exit behavior in the absence of work requirements for participants aged 50 or older, who are not subject to work requirements. We then use participants under age 50 who are *not* tagged as never exiters to predict exit behavior in the presence of work requirements. This second step allows us to distinguish between induced exiters and always exiters. We use these predictions to split both the under-50 and over-50 into three groups, so that RDs within each group have similar composition on either side. We assume away the case of participants who would remain on SNAP if there were work requirements, but would exit SNAP absent work requirements. This assumption is analogous to assuming no defiers in the potential outcomes framework.

earnings along a narrow range of the earnings distribution, but the primary mechanism for the earnings increase remains uncertain.

5.3 Welfare Impacts

The previous results establish that work requirements dramatically reduce overall participation and retention among the stock population of beneficiaries while possibly increasing earnings among a subset of this population. An optimal policy for SNAP eligibility would trade off these competing forces. While a full accounting of the welfare impacts of work requirements is outside the scope of this paper, this section presents a stylized calculation of the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) of work requirements in SNAP as a starting point.

The MVPF is the ratio of a program's beneficiaries' willingness to pay for the program to the government's cost of providing it (Hendren 2016). In keeping with the literature, we report the MVPF of an expansion, rather than a contraction, in government spending. We therefore calculate the MVPF for the *elimination* of work requirements. The MVPF is given by:

$$MVPF = \frac{WTP}{\underbrace{C}_{\text{direct}} + \underbrace{FE}_{\text{fiscal}}_{\text{program cost}} + \underbrace{FE}_{\text{externality}}$$

where the numerator represents the relevant ABAWDs' willingness to pay out of their own income to eliminate work requirements, and the denominator represents the total cost to the government of eliminating work requirements. The total cost is the sum of the direct cost of providing benefits to additional ABAWDs who participate in SNAP only in the absence of work requirements (the induced exiters of Section 5.2), and fiscal externalities such as reductions in income tax revenue. The relevant population for both the numerator and the denominator is the set of ABAWDs who would participate in SNAP in the absence of work requirements.

If the MVPF is larger than the MVPFs of other programs targeting the same population, then eliminating work requirements is efficient relative to these other policies. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2019) provide MVPFs for a range of programs based on prior literature that can serve as benchmarks: the MVPFs for other aspects of SNAP range from 0.42 to 1.04, with most estimates close to 1; the MVPFs for housing vouchers are between 0.65 and 0.76; the MVPFs for the 1986 and 1993 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions are between 1.0 and 1.20; and the MVPFs for other cash transfer programs are between 0.81 and 0.87.

To quantify the MVPF for eliminating SNAP work requirements, consider first the government's cost of eliminating the policy. The direct cost per beneficiary is equal to the average SNAP benefit for ABAWDs of \$189 per month,⁴⁸ multiplied by the fraction of the relevant population who participate in SNAP if and only if work requirements are eliminated. For consistency with the rest of the paper, we define the relevant population as ABAWDs who would still be enrolled in SNAP after eighteen months, leaving us with 63.1 percent of the ABAWDs who are enrolled at month zero (the natural retention rate reported in Table 5 Panel A). The fraction of the relevant population who participate if and only if work requirements are eliminated is then 0.238/0.631 = 0.377 (where 0.238 is our main RD estimate of work-requirements induced exit in Section 4.2). This yields a direct cost of $0.377 \cdot \$189 = \71.29 per person per month.

The fiscal externality consists of any changes in net government revenue that result from eliminating work requirements. In our context, a key component is the loss of income tax revenue due to labor market effects. The lost income taxes are given by our estimates of the earnings effect at different durations following the reintroduction of work requirements from Section 5.2. The upper bound on the earnings effect is 70.16/0.631 = 111.19 per person per month, where 70.16 comes from our largest estimate of the average earnings impact 24 months after work requirements.⁴⁹ The government's loss of revenue is 111.19multiplied by the tax rate on these earnings. For a single unmarried earner working 80 hours per month at the minimum wage (annual earnings of 6, 960), the average tax rate is approximately 16.5 percent.⁵⁰ Thus, the fiscal externality from lost tax revenue due to earnings responses is $0.165 \cdot 111.19 = 18.35$ per relevant ABAWD per month.⁵¹ This

⁴⁸The maximum SNAP benefit for a single-person household in the months following the reinstatement of work requirements is \$189. See Section 2.4 for details.

⁴⁹We use the earnings estimate from the 24-month regressions (Figure 8b) to obtain the least favorable MVPF for eliminating work requirements. The most favorable MVPF using the earnings estimate from the 18-month regressions (Figure 8a) is also given at the end of this section.

 $^{^{50}}$ To calibrate the tax rate, we note that few non-disabled, non-elderly childless adults are eligible for social programs that would implicitly tax their income. Therefore, average tax rates are primarily composed of payroll taxes of 15.3 percent applied to all earnings, plus a 10 percent income tax applied to earnings above the standard deduction (\$6,300 in 2015).

⁵¹The fiscal externality could, in principle, also include changes in per-participant monthly benefits as a result of partial phase-out of benefits with rising earned income. SNAP benefits are reduced by \$0.24 for every additional dollar of earned income. Average benefits for ABAWDs in Virginia are from the data constructed in Mills et al. (2014), which we obtained from the USDA via the Freedom of Information Act. As discussed in Section 2.1, benefits are reduced by 30 cents for each additional dollar of income, in addition to a 20 percent earned income deduction. This implies that SNAP benefits effectively decline by 24 cents for each additional dollar of earned income. In the MVPF calculation, we assume that the earnings impacts of work requirements are a result of income effects. This means earnings increase only among work participants who exit as a result

amount results in a denominator of 71.29 + 18.35 = 89.64 per relevant ABAWD per month.

The numerator of the MVPF is a relevant ABAWD's willingness to pay to eliminate work requirements. In the literature, the numerator is typically equal to the value of the benefits change, as any behavioral response to the policy change is assumed to have zero impact on utility. This assumption of zero impact relies on the envelope theorem combined with benefit changes being "small." In our setting, the policy change being considered does not change the *amount* of benefits received conditional on receipt. Instead, the elimination of work requirements gives benefits to new participants and gives working beneficiaries the option to work less. The former is given by the value of the benefits, multiplied by the fraction of the relevant population that gains benefits if work requirements are eliminated: (0.238/0.631) \cdot \$189 = \$71.29⁵² The latter benefit is usually ignored in MVPF calculations by assuming that any utility changes from reoptimizing behavior are second-order. In the setting of SNAP work requirements, the reoptimization may lead to substantial utility changes (see Figure A.1). The utility change for this group is bounded between \$0 and \$189 per ABAWD.⁵³ The largest group to whom these bounds could apply constitutes approximately 0.12/0.631 = 19 percent of the relevant population, where 0.12 is the fraction of percentiles for which we detect earnings impacts in Figure 8b. Thus, the numerator of the MVPF is bounded between \$71.29 and $71.29 + 0.19 \cdot 189 = 107.20^{54}$

⁵³We obtain bounds on the effort cost of work requirements-induced work using a revealed preferences argument. The lower bound is equal to the additional income; if the effort cost were less than the additional income, then these participants would work more even in the absence of work requirements. The upper bound is equal to the additional income and the value of SNAP benefits, which is what participants stand to gain from working when there are work requirements. At the lower bound, the utility cost of working exactly offsets the income gains from working, resulting in a utility of \$189 regardless of work requirements. At the upper bound, the utility cost offsets the income gains plus the SNAP benefits, resulting in a utility gain of \$189 from eliminating work requirements.

⁵⁴This calculation assumes that earnings impacts are concentrated among participants who are induced to exit by work requirements. If we instead assume that earnings impacts are concentrated among participants who remain on SNAP, then eliminating work requirements increases the numerator by a further \$26.69, bounding the numerator between 71.29 + 26.69 = 97.98 and 107.20 + 26.69 = 133.89 (see footnote 51).

of the work requirements, so their income changes are already accounted for in the tax revenue calculation. If the earnings impacts are instead driven by incentive effects, then the government has an additional fiscal externality of $0.24 \cdot \$111.19 = \26.69 for a total denominator of \$71.29 + \$18.35 + \$26.69 = \$116.33 per relevant ABAWD per month.

⁵²Two caveats are in order. First, this amount is not a "small" change for many beneficiaries, so this transfer is directly proportional to a utility gain only if income effects are small (e.g. quasi-linear utility). Second, this willingness to pay will be lower if ABAWDs value a dollar of SNAP benefits at less than a dollar of income. Many studies find that a dollar of SNAP benefits is spent like a dollar of cash (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009, Hoynes et al. 2015), and this is the assumption we maintain in the main MVPF calculation. However, Hastings and Shapiro (2018) find that a dollar of SNAP is valued at only \$0.50 of cash. In that case, the value of the benefits in the numerator would be reduced from \$71.29 to \$35.65.

We now have approximations for the numerator and the denominator of the MVPF for eliminating work requirements. Using our largest estimate of the earnings response twenty-four months after work requirements (see Figure 8b), the MVPF is bounded below by 71.29/\$89.64 = 0.80 if individuals pay no utility cost of working more as a result of work requirements. If individuals pay a utility cost for the large behavior change of working more, the MVPF is bounded above by 107.20/\$89.64 = 1.20.⁵⁵ If the true earnings response is zero, as we find eighteen months after work requirements (see Figure 8a), then the MVPF is bounded between 71.29/\$71.29 = 1 and $(71.29 + 0.12 \cdot \$189)/\$71.29 = 1.32$. Recall that most existing estimates of the MVPF of various aspects of SNAP and cash transfer programs are near 1 (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2019). Under the assumption that the earnings response to work requirements, if any, has a non-marginal utility cost, the MVPF of eliminating work requirements compares favorably with other policies targeting the SNAP population.

Of course, these stylized calculations omit potentially sizable fiscal externalities arising from the elimination of work requirements. In the calculation, we only consider the portion that we can estimate: the income tax revenue change from the direct response to work requirements. However, the literature has documented additional effects from expanding SNAP participation, which may produce other fiscal externalities. SNAP benefits improve nutrition and have been shown to reduce health care spending, much of which is subsidized by the government through the tax treatment of employer-based health insurance or, more directly, through Medicaid (Sonik 2016, East and Friedson 2020). SNAP benefits also decrease crime (Tuttle 2019), which may reduce direct costs to victims and government spending on the criminal justice system. Each of these potential externalities would decrease the magnitude of the denominator in the MVPF calculation, increasing the MVPF. A possible countervailing externality would obtain if there are long-term positive labor market effects of work requirements that are not detectable in our sample. The closest available evidence comes from Card and Hyslop (2005), who document no difference in long-run earnings from a Canadian welfare program. On net, the evidence from the literature indicates that any omitted fiscal externalities are likely to increase the MVPF we calculated above, rather than decrease it.

⁵⁵If the earnings response is driven by incentive effects, then the MVPF is bounded below by 97.98/116.33 = 0.84 and bounded above by 107.20/116.33 = 0.92 (see footnotes 51 and 54).

6 Conclusion

As work requirements in means-tested programs come to the forefront of modern policy debates, it is critical to understand their causal impact on program participation and work. On one hand, work requirements may reduce benefits for economically vulnerable adults without a counterbalancing improvement in labor market outcomes. On the other hand, work requirements could successfully incentivize labor force participation, thereby helping to counter means-tested programs' disincentives to work.

We measure the magnitude of both phenomena by combining SNAP and UI administrative data from Virginia with quasi-experimental policy variation. We find that SNAP work requirements dramatically reduce participation among affected adults, with point estimates suggesting a 52 percent decline in participation by the completion of the roll-out. Focusing on the sample of people already on SNAP just before the reintroduction of work requirements, we estimate a 38 percent drop in retention. These declines are largest among homeless beneficiaries and beneficiaries with no earned income at the time of program entry. At the same time, we statistically rule out a large average increase in UI-covered employment, and fail to detect an increase in self-employment or wage earnings along a large majority of the distribution. There is, however, tentative evidence of increased earnings in the vicinity of the eligibility threshold. In practice, work requirements appear to screen out a large number of potential SNAP beneficiaries in exchange for an earnings increase among a limited subset of individuals.

The similarity of participation patterns at younger ages subject to work requirements suggests that our results may also generalize to SNAP beneficiaries below age 50 (Figure 2b). A natural extension of this work would use linked administrative data to examine the interaction of SNAP work requirements with other government programs. Understanding the effects of work requirements on other important outcomes, such as food security, health spending, and evictions, are also important directions for future research.

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Online Appendices [Not for Publication]

A Institutional Details of Virginia SNAP

This Appendix first presents a stylized budget constraint for ABAWDs with and without work requirements, and then discusses exemptions from the work requirements, and reinstatement of the policy in October 2013.

A.1 ABAWD Budget Constraint

Work requirements create a notch in the budget constraint as shown in Figure A.1. For ABAWDs facing work requirements, the budget constraint is represented by ABCFE, with the notch at C. If an ABAWD does not meet the hours threshold, then they lose SNAP after their 3 months of time-limited benefits are used and the budget line drops down to F. Without work requirements, the budget constraint extends from point C to D. There is slight kink between C and D to reflect the deduction rules that enable SNAP recipients to receive the full SNAP benefit provided their income is below a certain level. This budget constraint abstracts from asset limits (Virginia has limits on liquid assets, such as cash on hand or money in accounts). The graph also does not plot the minimum SNAP benefits, which would change the slope of the budget line close to point B, since our interest is in the notch created by work requirements. The graph draws indifference curves for two hypothetical ABAWDs who do not face work requirements. The person with preferences U^1 is working near the hours threshold without work requirements, and would relocate to point C with work requirements, rather than drop down to the segment EF. This represents the "incentive effect" of the policy. The person with preferences U^2 works only a few hours without work requirements, and would relocate along FE when faced with work requirements given the curvature of their utility function: reaching the hours threshold is too costly for this person and so they exit SNAP and increase their hours. This response constitutes the "income effect" of the policy that removes recipients unable or unwilling to work enough to retain benefits.

A.2 ABAWD Work Requirement Exemptions

Individuals are exempt from general work registration if they are younger than 16 years old, 60 years old or older, working 30 hours or more each week, receiving or applying to receive unemployment insurance, serving as a caretaker of a child under the age of 6, temporarily or permanently incapacitated, ill or disabled, regularly participating in an alcohol or substance abuse rehabilitation program, aged 16 or 17 and attending school for at least a half-time basis, aged 16 or 17 but not head of household, enrolled in a recognized school, job skills training, or





Hours not working

Notes: Figure plots a stylized budget constraint in income-hours space for an ABAWD with work requirements (solid line) and without work requirements (dotted line extension). Without work requirements, the budget set is represented by ABCDE. The number of hours not working is represented on the x-axis, which is a subset of total hours of leisure. Searching for work, which is not part of leisure, does not count towards meeting the work requirements. An ABAWD without work requirements who does not work is represented by the point D, receiving the max SNAP benefit. They can continue to receive the maximum benefit below a certain income threshold due to the deduction rules. Once deductions apply (represented by the slight kink in the dotted line between C and D), SNAP benefits phase out at 30 cents for each dollar of earned income. At point B, the person works enough to earn over 130% FPL and no longer receives SNAP. The budget constraint with work requirements is ABCFE. Under work requirements, the person does not receive any SNAP benefits after their 3 months of time-limited benefits are used unless they reach the hours threshold. Their income in the range below the minimum hours threshold is represented by the segment EF. Working beyond this threshold grants access to SNAP benefits, as represented by the notch in the budget constraint at C. Examples of indifference curves for two types of ABAWDs are drawn tangent to the no-work requirements budget constraint. Under work requirements, ABAWDs with indifference curve U^1 would relocate to C, while ABAWDs with indifference curve U^2 would relocate to E.

institution of higher education for at least a half-time basis, already complying with another assistance program's work requirements (e.g., TANF or unemployment compensation), or a full-time caretaker of an incapacitated person. Adults are exempt from ABAWD work requirements if they are younger than 18 years old, aged 50 or older, pregnant, medically certified as unable to work, living in a household that includes a child under the age of 18, exempt from general work registration or living in a locality that is exempt from work requirements. A Localities (counties and independent cities) may also receive exemptions from the ABAWD work requirements in some circumstances. Specifically, the state office analyzes data and submits a waiver of the requirements for localities that meet qualifications established by the USDA/FNS. A locality may receive an exemption from work requirements if it has a recent 12-month average of unemployment rate above 10 percent, a recent 3-month average unemployment rate above 10 percent, a historical seasonal unemployment rate above 10 percent, a designation as a Labor Surplus Area by the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration, a qualification for extended unemployment benefits by the Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service, a low and declining employmentto-population ratio, a lack of jobs in declining occupations or industries, or a recent 24-month average unemployment rate that is 20 percent above the national average for the same 24month period.

Other than these exemptions, ABAWDs who have already exhausted their allotted SNAP benefits (i.e., 3 months in a 36-month window) can maintain or regain eligibility for SNAP benefits by working at least 20 hours or more per week, participating in an employment services program operated by the Virginia Department of Social Services for 20 hours or more per week (or for at least the number of hours equal to the household's benefits amount divided by the federal minimum wage), participating in an approved work program for 20 hours or more a week, or volunteering for at least the number of hours equal to a household's benefits divided by the federal minimum wage. The state is also annually allotted (by the USDA) a reserve of monthly exemptions based on 15 percent of the number of ABAWD enrollees who live in the state who are not exempted otherwise and do not live in exempted localities. These exemptions may be used by the state to extend the certification period.

A.3 Virginia's Reinstatement of Work Requirements

ABAWD work requirements were reinstated in Virginia on October 1, 2013 coinciding with the end of state-wide work requirement exemptions under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which lasted from April 2009 to September 2013. As shown in Figure A.2, participation rose substantially during the ARRA period but began to fall soon afterwards. The end of ARRA also coincided with an approximately 7 percent drop in the level of SNAP benefits allotted to SNAP recipients in Virginia (Figure A.3). The identification strategy based on regression discontinuity accounts for this benefit change in estimating the causal effect of work requirements, since the benefit change occurs similarly on both sides of the age 50 cutoff.





Notes: Figure plots monthly SNAP participation across Virginia measured in thousands. Participation rose substantially during the ARRA period before falling in 2014.

Prior to the reinstatement of work requirements, individuals typically would receive 12-month recertification periods. Individuals who began their current benefit receipt period prior to the reinstatement of work requirements continued to receive SNAP benefits up to their recertification date, which would occur after reinstatement. At recertification, their work compliance was evaluated. If they were found to be in compliance of work requirements at recertification, they were given a 12-month recertification period. If they were found not to be in compliance, they were given a 6-month recertification period. This recertification period was composed of an initial partial month of benefits, 3 months allotted for a 36month window, and a remaining 2 months of exemptions from the reserve of 15 percent exemptions allotted to the state. If after this 6-month period they were again found not to be in compliance with work requirements, they were immediately disenrolled from the program and stopped receiving benefits. The distribution of 15 percent waiver exemptions over time is shown in Figure A.4. These waivers were heavily used throughout most of





Notes: Figure plots monthly benefits per SNAP recipient across Virginia, calculated as total benefits divided by total SNAP participation. Benefits were reduced by about 7 percent at the end of ARRA.

2014 but were sparingly used after September of 2014. As a result, Figure A.5 displays a correspondingly large spike in exits of ABAWDs in October of 2014 due to exhaustion of allowable benefit months. If after this 6-month period they were found to be in compliance of work requirements, they were given a 12-month recertification period.

Virginia initially reinstated ABAWD work requirements for all counties in the state on October 1, 2013. However, starting in May 2014, Virginia obtained exemptions for ABAWDs living in 23 counties. Individuals who live in these counties and whose recertifications occurred after the reinstatement of work requirements but before May 2014 received 6 month recertifications. As a result, Figure A.5 shows that ABAWD exits due to exhaustion of allotted benefit months from exempt counties is almost non-existent after October 2014. Those recertifying after May 2014 in exempt counties received 12 month recertifications. In May 2015, Virginia exempted an additional 14 counties.⁵⁶

Finally, ABAWDs who newly enrolled between October 2013 and September 2014 were (theoretically) given 6-month recertification periods. Again, these recertification periods were composed of an initial partial month of benefits, 3 months allotted for a

⁵⁶The following counties and cities were exempted in 2014 and 2015: Bristol, Brunswick, Buchanan, Carroll, Charlotte, Danville, Dickenson, Emporia, Franklin City, Galax, Grayson, Greensville, Halifax, Henry, Hopewell, Lee, Luneburg, Martinsville, Mecklenburg, Norton, Page, Patrick, Petersburg, Pittsylvania, Prince Edward, Prince George, Richmond County, Russell, Scott, Smyth, Southampton, Surry, Sussex, Washington, Williamsburg, Wise, Wythe.





Notes: Figure plots the count of 15 percent waiver exemptions used in Virginia each month. One unit corresponds to one ABAWD being allowed to remain on SNAP for one additional month despite not meeting work requirements. The 15 percent exemptions were primarily used to extend the benefit eligibility of ABAWDs who would otherwise have been removed from SNAP following the reintroduction of work requirements in October 2013.

Figure A.5: Count of SNAP Exits Due to Failure to Meet ABAWD Work Requirements



Notes: Figure plots the count of SNAP exits that occur as a result of exhausting allowable benefit months without fulfilling work requirements.

36-month window, and a remaining 2 months of exemptions from the reserve of 15 percent exemptions allotted to the state. Since 15 percent exemption waivers were not used as readily after September of 2014, those who newly enrolled on or after May of 2014 did not receive a full 6 months of benefits if they did not meet work requirements. And those enrolling between July 2014 and September 2017 generally only received 4-month recertification periods. The variation in recertification periods corresponds to drops in SNAP participation among cohorts of recipients who enroll after October 2013, as depicted in Figure C.5: Figure C.5a shows that the RD point estimate among new participants with 6-month recertifications (October 2013 to April 2014 cohorts) drops substantially in the seventh month. In contrast, Figure C.5b shows that among those with 4-month recertifications (May 2014 to December 2014 cohorts), participation drops in the fifth month. In both cases the RD effects are large and largely comparable in magnitude to the effect estimated using the stock population in the main text.

B Summary of Related Literature

Paper	Labor Market Data Source	SNAP Data Source	Data Structure	States	Identification Strategy
Stacy, Scherpf, and Jo (2018)	ACS (restricted use)	Administrative SNAP dataLabor: Cross-sectional SNAP: Panel9 State		9 States	RD-DD
Harris (2019)	ACS (public use)	ACS (public use)	ACS (public use) Cross-sectional		DD & DDD
Han (2019)	ACS (public use)	ACS (public use)	Cross-sectional	Nationwide	DDD
Cuffey, Mykerezi, and Beatty (2015)	CPS (public use)	CPS (public use)	Cross-sectional	Nationwide	DDD
Ritter (2018)	CPS (public use), QC Data (administrative)	N/A	Cross-sectional	29 States	RD
This paper	Administrative UI data	Administrative SNAP data	Panel	Virginia	Doughnut- RD

 Table B.1: Summary Table of Close Contemporaneous Literature

Paper	Selected Population for Analysis	Inclusion of Non-treated	Selection Bias? Endogenous variables	
Stacy, Scherpf, and Jo (2018)	Ages 25–54 who do not appear to be disabled, have no children under the age of 18, and at or below 250% of the FPL. For labor market outcome analysis, only those who receive SNAP in the 12 months prior to interview date.	Yes	Yes, labor outcomes conditional on SNAP participation, being below 250% of FPL, disability	
Harris (2019)	Ages 25–54 who do not appear to be disabled, have no children under the age of 18. Limited to US citizens in continental US who are not institutionalized, in active duty military, or foster care.	Yes	Yes, labor outcomes conditional on disability	
Han (2019)	Ages 18–60 who do not appear to be disabled, have no children under the age of 18, and at or below 300% of the FPL.	Yes	Yes, labor outcomes conditional on being below 300% of FPL, disability	
Cuffey, Mykerezi, and Beatty (2015)	Ages 18–65 who do not appear to be disabled, have no children under the age of 18, and do not go to school.	Yes	Yes, labor outcomes conditional on disability	
Ritter (2018)	CPS: U.S. citizen adults in different age ranges around age 50, who have no children under the age of 18 and who have no High School diploma. QC1: Individuals who do not live with children under the age of 18. QC2: Individuals who do not live with children under the age of 18 and who are not coded as having a disability	CPS - Yes QC1 - Yes QC2 - No	CPS - No. QC1 - Yes, labor outcome conditional on SNAP participation. QC2 - Yes, labor outcome conditional on SNAP participation and disability	
This paper	VA General population (used for case count): SNAP participants who have no children under the age of 18, who are not exempt from work registration and have no known disabilities. Stock population: VA General population members who are enrolled in SNAP in September 2013, who have no children under the age of 18, who are not exempt from work registration and have no known disabilities in that month.	No (at time of sample construction)	No	

Table B.1: Summary Table of Close Contemporaneous Literature (continued)

Paper	SNAP Participation for control group or at 50 y.o. cutoff	Average Labor Outcome for control group or at 50 y.o. cutoff	Main Findings
Stacy, Scherpf, and Jo (2018)	20%	Employment (conditional on SNAP): 48.4%	Work reqt. cause SNAP participation to drop by 3pp but have no significant impact on labor outcomes. No evidence it causes an increase in claims of disability.
Harris (2019)	$15.6 ext{} 18.3\%$	Employment: 71.5–72.5%	Work reqt. cause SNAP participation to drop by 1.6–1.8pp. They increase employment by 1.1–1.3pp.
Han (2019)	16.60%	Employment: 74.9% Annual earnings: \$15,026	Work reqt. exemptions cause SNAP participation to increase by 1.6pp. No significant impact on employment. But find that work reqt. exemptions cause usual weekly hours worked if employed to decrease by 0.388 hours.
Cuffey, Mykerezi, and Beatty (2015)	N/A	N/A	No statistically significant impact on SNAP participation, employment or working ≥ 20 hours.
Ritter (2018)	CPS - N/A QC - 100%	CPS - work >20h: 40–58% QC - work >20h: 10–25%	No significant impact on employment except some evidence among the males with disability population from the QC2 sample with 7.3pp effect, significant at the 10% level. Authors find that this result does not stand up to falsification test.
This paper	Month 0: 100% Month 18: 63.1%	Month 0 employment (SNAP application): 18.6% Month 18 employment (UI): 29% Month 18 annual earnings (UI): \$4,276.80	ABAWD SNAP participation decreases by 52% overall and by 38% (24pp) for the stock population 18 months after Work reqt. reinstatement. Homeless and beneficiaries with no earned income at time of entry are disproportionately impacted. Average employment increases of more than 2 percentage points are ruled out. Evidence found of increased earnings near a key eligibility threshold.

Table B.1: Summary Table of Close Contemporaneous Literature (continued)	

C Additional Results

	All		Non-ABAWD Adults		ABAWDs	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	24.29	32.8	41.2	16.4	32.4	9.9
Adult	0.55	0.50	1.00	0.000	1.00	0.02
Female	0.54	0.50	0.62	0.48	0.39	0.49
Married	0.13	0.33	0.27	0.44	0.08	0.27
Household Size	3.0	1.7	2.6	1.6	1.2	0.6
Household Head	0.43	0.50	0.76	0.43	0.88	0.32
Homeless	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.14	0.12	0.32
White	0.41	0.49	0.45	0.50	0.37	0.48
Black	0.36	0.48	0.34	0.47	0.37	0.48
Some College+	0.07	0.25	0.13	0.33	0.12	0.32
Has Earned Income	0.13	0.34	0.26	0.44	0.16	0.37
Has Unearned Income	0.24	0.42	0.34	0.47	0.08	0.27
Avg. Annual Wages	4,200	10,463	$7,\!993$	$13,\!492$	$5,\!940$	11,366
Fraction of Months Employed	0.22	0.36	0.39	0.41	0.37	0.38
Ever reported						
Any Disability	0.15	0.36	0.29	0.45	0.09	0.28
Exempt from Work Registration	0.39	0.49	0.70	0.46	0.26	0.44
Exempt Due to Dependent	0.13	0.34	0.25	0.43	0.08	0.27
Medicaid Recipient	0.69	0.46	0.60	0.49	0.29	0.45
TANF Recipient	0.22	0.42	0.16	0.36	0.05	0.21
SNAP E&T Participant	0.04	0.19	0.05	0.21	0.16	0.36
Moved County	0.23	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.22	0.41
N	$2,\!272,\!827$		1,008,085		238,782	

Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics of SNAP Participant-Months in Full Sample (2005-2016)

Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics of SNAP participant-months across the whole sample, rather than restricted to the stock population in the main analysis. N denotes count of participant-months. The variables Has Earned Income and Has Unearned Income are reported in DSS files. The variables Avg. Annual Wages and the Fraction of Months Employed are both calculated from UI records.





Notes: Figure plots participation survival for ABAWDs aged 42–49 and able-bodied adults without dependents or disabilities aged 50–56 in counties with exemptions for work requirements in May 2014, who have not had a SNAP spell earlier in our sample period, and who first receive benefits between July 2014 and December 2014.



Figure C.2: RD Estimate of Total SNAP Participation

(c) 12 Months After Work Requirements

(d) 24 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Figure visually displays the RD results for total SNAP participation 12 months before, 0 months after, 12 months after, and 24 months after work requirements. The scatter plot shows total participant counts by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors are clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of the subset of counties for which work requirements remain on after October 2013.



Figure C.3: RD Estimates of Total SNAP Participation at Other Intervals

(b) Age Polynomial: Quadratic

Notes: Figure shows RD coefficients for SNAP participation, repeated for other intervals in addition to the baseline interval (18 months after work requirements). In this figure, the coefficient at 2015m3 corresponds to Figure 5a. Panel A presents RD estimates using linear age polynomials and Panel B presents estimates with quadratic age polynomials for robustness. Shaded regions denote 95 percent confidence intervals that cluster standard errors on monthly age.

Figure C.4: RD Estimates of New SNAP Enrollment by Cohort



Notes: Figures show coefficients for total new enrollment RDs across successive cohorts of new SNAP entrants. Each regression uses a different MSE-optimal bandwidth, with the bandwidths calculated separately on each side of the cutoff. Shaded regions denote 95 percent confidence intervals that cluster standard errors on monthly age.





(b) 4-Month Initial Benefit Month Regime

Notes: Figures show RD coefficients for SNAP enrollee cohorts that enter SNAP for the first time since the reinstatement of work requirements in October of 2013, at given points in time since their month of enrollment. Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by monthly age. Each regression uses the MSE-optimal bandwidth with separate bandwidths calculated on either side of the cutoff.

Figure C.6: RD Estimates of SNAP Participation at Other Intervals, Stock Sample



Notes: Figure shows RD coefficients for SNAP participation in the post-ARRA period among the stock population, repeated for other intervals in addition to the baseline interval (18 months after work requirements). In this figure, the coefficient at 2015m3 corresponds to Figure 6a. Shaded regions denote 95 percent confidence intervals that cluster standard errors on monthly age.



Figure C.7: Robustness to Bandwidth Selection

Notes: Figures plots the RD estimates 18 months after work requirements were reinstated using different bandwidths. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties where work requirements remain on after October 2013. Earnings are winsorized at the 99 percent level within monthly age.



Figure C.8: Density of Age at SNAP Enrollment

(b) No Work Requirements Counties

Notes: Figures plots the distribution of age at SNAP enrollment within quarterly bins for those in counties with work requirements and those without work requirements. In counties without work requirements, there is no visible discontinuity in the density at age 50. In counties with work requirements, participation appears to be slightly lower just to the left of 50, although the magnitude is small and formal statistical tests (Frandsen 2017) fail to reject the null that the density is smooth at this cutoff. Taken together, there is not strong evidence of selection based on age around the eligibility threshold for work requirements.


Figure C.9: RD Estimates of SNAP Retention Under Equal Recerticiation Counts

Notes: Figure plots RD results for SNAP participation after eighteen months of work requirements only for the subset of the stock population whose first recertification after the reinstatement of work requirements occurs in the months of October 2013 through March 2014. Participants in this subset of the stock population would have experienced the same number of recertifications (two) if they remain on SNAP 18 months after the reinstatement of work requirements, whether they are in the younger-than-50-group or in the 50-andolder group. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties for which work requirements remain on after October 2013.

Figure C.10: RD Estimates of Employment (UI or DSS), 18 Months After Work Requirements



(b) Placebo Test: Employment During ARRA Exemptions

Notes: Panel (a) visually displays the RD results for employment in either the UI data or in DSS-reported earnings after 18 months of work requirements. The scatter plot shows covariate-adjusted means by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit in months on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties where work requirements remain on after October 2013. Panel (b) replicates the same analysis among those participating in September 2011, when the ARRA exemption that suspended work requirements was in effect for an additional two years.



Figure C.11: RD Estimates of Log Earnings, 18 Months After Work Requirements

(b) Placebo Test: Log Earnings During ARRA Exemptions

Notes: Panel (a) visually displays the RD results for log earnings after 18 months of work requirements. The scatter plot shows covariate-adjusted means by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit in months on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties where work requirements remain on after October 2013. Panel (b) replicates the same analysis among those participating in September 2011, when the ARRA exemption that suspended work requirements was in effect for an additional two years.



Figure C.12: RD Estimates of Exempt Status, 18 Months After Work Requirements

(b) Placebo Test: Exempt Status During ARRA Exemptions

Notes: Panel (a) visually displays the RD results for reported exemptions (except for age) after 18 months of work requirements. The scatter plot shows covariate-adjusted means by age in quarters, and the lines show a linear regression fit in months on both sides of the eligibility threshold. Standard errors clustered by monthly age in parentheses. The sample consists of work-registered individuals on SNAP in September 2013 and in the subset of counties where work requirements remain on after October 2013. Panel (b) replicates the same analysis among those participating in September 2011, when the ARRA exemption that suspended work requirements was in effect for an additional two years.



Figure C.13: RD Estimates of Employment and Earnings at Other Intervals

Notes: Figure shows RD coefficients for employment and earnings, repeated for other intervals in addition to the baseline interval. Each estimate calculated using a separate MSE-optimal bandwidths on each side of the donut. Shaded regions denote 95 percent confidence intervals that cluster standard errors on monthly age.

	Linear Uniform		Linear Triangular		Quadratic Uniform		Quadratic Triangular	
	Main	Placebo	Main	Placebo	Main	Placebo	Main	Placebo
	Sept 2013	Sept 2011	Sept 2013	Sept 2011	Sept 2013	Sept 2011	Sept 2013	Sept 2011
Panel A. SNAP Participation								
Discontinuity	-0.238	0.003	-0.242	0.017	-0.232	0.020	-0.233	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Control Mean	0.631	0.664	0.634	0.656	0.632	0.653	0.633	0.647
N	$15,\!675$	$13,\!438$	19,714	$16,\!017$	$24,\!445$	$21,\!131$	$28,\!536$	$23,\!043$
Panel B. Employed								
Discontinuity	-0.007	0.005	-0.003	0.008	-0.018	0.009	-0.014	0.012
Ŭ	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Control Mean	0.290	0.278	0.281	0.274	0.273	0.278	0.279	0.275
N	$18,\!919$	$20,\!651$	$19,\!149$	$22,\!542$	$22,\!984$	$21,\!653$	$26,\!897$	$28,\!091$
Panel C. Earnings								
Discontinuity	-6.4	31.2	-9.1	27.7	-20.1	46.7	11.3	33.3
Ŭ	(19.4)	(23.0)	(16.7)	(23.1)	(31.4)	(33.2)	(26.0)	(31.5)
Control Mean	356.4	342.8	363.0	342.5	357.5	353.3	349.3	351.1
N	16,027	$18,\!243$	22,772	$21,\!978$	$22,\!253$	$24,\!346$	$23,\!058$	$28,\!483$

Table C.2: RD Estimates Under Alternative Models

Notes: Table shows the main RD estimates under alternative specifications for the kernel and polynomial order. Separate MSE-optimal bandwidths are calculated on each side of the donut for each regression. The first two columns show RD estimates for the stock population (enrolled September 2013) and the placebo stock population (September 2011) using Y_i 18 months later, using the controls described in the text. The third and fourth columns re-weight observations using a triangular kernel. The last four columns replicate this exercise using a quadratic fit on either side of the RD. Control mean is the predicted mean of the corresponding outcome variable immediately to the right of the age 50 threshold (the intercept with the cutoff).



Figure C.14: RD Estimates of Employment and Earnings at Other Intervals, Without Controls

Notes: Figure shows RD coefficients for employment and earnings, repeated for other intervals in addition to the baseline interval, in models without controls. Each estimate calculated using a separate MSE-optimal bandwidths on each side of the donut. Shaded regions denote 95 percent confidence intervals that cluster standard errors on monthly age.

	Main Stock	Placebo Stock
	(September 2013)	(ARRA Period)
Panel A SNAP Participation		
Discontinuity	-0.250	0.014
Discontinuity	(0.014)	(0.021)
Control Mean	0.631	0.663
N	17 438	13 699
	11,100	10,000
Panel B. Employment		
Discontinuity	0.009	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.015)
Control Mean	0.281	0.278
Ν	$16,\!052$	$15,\!176$
Punet C. Employed of Earnea Income	0.001	0.010
Discontinuity	-0.001	(0.010)
Control Moon	(0.021)	(0.017)
	0.340	0.333 15 176
1	14,739	15,170
Panel D. Earnings		
Discontinuity	14.7	25.4
	(25.3)	(29.4)
Control Mean	368.4	343.0
N	$15,\!081$	$15,\!877$
Panal F. Log Farmings		
Discontinuity	0.051	0 109
Discontinuity	(0.108)	(0.105)
Control Mean	1 941	1 854
N	17 324	15 606
11	11,021	10,000
Panel F. Exemption (Other than Age)		
Discontinuity	0.053	-0.015
	(0.013)	(0.012)
Control Mean	0.096	0.111
Ν	$15\ 137$	18564

Table C.3: RD Estimates of Key Outcomes Without Controls, 18 Months After Work Requirements

Notes: Table shows regressions coefficients from local linear RD specifications with a uniform kernel, without covariates. Standard errors clustered by monthly age (the running variable) are reported in parentheses. Control mean is the predicted mean of the corresponding outcome variable immediately to the right of the age 50 threshold (the intercept with the cutoff). Employment and earnings are measured from UI records. Log earnings calculated as $\ln(y + 1)$. Earnings include those with zero UI earnings, and are winsorized at the 99 percent level by monthly age. The variables Earned Income and Exemption status are reported on DSS records.

	Quintile of Predicted Employment Probability					
		in September 2013				
	All	Lowest	2nd	3rd	4th	Highest
Panel A. SNAP Participation						
Discontinuity	-0.250	-0.286	-0.220	-0.275	-0.251	-0.122
	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Control Mean	0.631	0.669	0.685	0.669	0.649	0.462
Ν	$17,\!438$	$4,\!496$	3,795	3,925	$3,\!491$	$3,\!390$
Panel B. Employment						
Discontinuity	0.009	0.023	-0.004	-0.028	-0.029	-0.006
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.031)
Control Mean	0.281	0.092	0.189	0.222	0.412	0.694
N	$16,\!052$	4,725	$3,\!989$	$3,\!519$	$2,\!507$	$3,\!143$
Panel C. Earnings						
Discontinuity	20.414	65.896	-77.107	25.518	15.022	4.549
	(27.557)	(50.127)	(39.939)	(52.619)	(58.274)	(76.089)
Control Mean	374.175	132.719	251.026	234.978	447.262	1016.005
N	$14,\!947$	$4,\!110$	4,209	$3,\!169$	$3,\!416$	2,757

Table C.4: RD Estimates for SNAP Participation and Employment Outcomes at 18 months, by Labor Force Attachment

Notes: Table presents the RD coefficient estimates for SNAP participation, employment and earnings for different levels of labor force attachment. Labor force attachment is based on the predicted probability of employment in September 2013, using LASSO regression with data-dependent, theory-driven penalization based on Belloni et al. (2012). The regression includes the following controls to predict employment: indicators for yearly age, indicators for earnings in each month of the previous 7 years prior to Sept. 2013, household size, and indicators for gender, married, private living arrangement, white, black, some college or higher education, reporting earned income on the SNAP application, and reporting unearned income on the SNAP application. Table includes the coefficient, standard error, intercept, and sample size for each specification. Control mean is the predicted mean of the corresponding outcome variable immediately to the right of the age 50 threshold (the intercept with the cutoff).

Figure C.15: Heterogeneity in RD Estimates of Earnings Using Same Bandwidth, During ARRA Exemptions Placebo Period



(b) Placebo During ARRA Exemptions: 24-Month Interval

Notes: Figure plots coefficients from individual-level regressions of monthly earnings. Each coefficient is from a separate regression for that quantile using the recentered influence function method of Firpo et al. (2009). Estimates are from the placebo population of individuals on SNAP in September 2011, when the ARRA exemption that suspended work requirements was in effect for an additional two years. Top panel measures earnings in March 2013; bottom panel measures earnings in September 2013. Shading denotes 95 percent confidence intervals using robust standard errors.

D Details of Machine Learning Algorithm

This Appendix describes the machine learning algorithm to estimate the income and incentive effects of work requirements. The goal of the machine learning algorithm is to classify participants into never exiters, induced exiters, or always exiters. The last category primarily consists of participants who would exit SNAP by September 2015 regardless of the presence of work requirements, and who are therefore not useful for estimating the income or incentive effects.

The classification proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we identify and discard the set of participants who would attrit from SNAP by September 2015 even in the absence of work requirements. We identify them by training a LASSO of an indicator for program exit on a wide array of features (listed below) for participants aged 50 to 60, who are not subject to work requirements. We then use these estimates (interpretable as predicted probabilities of exit) to classify participants of all ages into those who would or would not exit. Our main specification selects the classification cutoff to match the empirical probability of exit (39.8%). In the second step, we run an analogous LASSO on participants under 50 (and therefore subject to work requirements) who are *not* predicted to be always exiters, classifying them into never exiters or induced exiters.

More specifically, we begin the process by tuning a LASSO on participants aged 50-60 using ten-fold cross-validation. We implement the algorithm using the glmnet package in R using 10-fold cross-validation within each fold to select the tuning parameter λ . We grid search over values of λ between 0.0005 and 0.1 in increments of 0.0005. The features (i.e. covariates) among which the trees select are: indicator variables for female, race is black, race is white, living in a private residence, married, education is less than high school, some high school, high school graduate, some college (omitted category is college graduate), has earned income, has unearned income, ever before had a disability; other variables are household size, 6-month recertification cohort; in the preperiod: fraction of months with wages, sum of preperiod wages, number of months on SNAP; number of months on SNAP in the last 36 months, number of months on SNAP in the last 12 months; wage history from 2005m1-2013m8; and county indicators.

Using this tuned LASSO, we use five folds to obtain predicted values: we run the tuned LASSO on 80 percent of the sample and use the resulting covariates to predict values for the remaining 20 percent.⁵⁷ After five iterations of LASSO (with potentially differing

⁵⁷This helps to prevent bias due to endogenous stratification. For example, suppose we predict earnings and then estimate heterogeneous effect of work requirements on earnings along the range of predicted earnings. Abadie et al. (2013) illustrate how overfitting in the predictive model causes systematic bias in the estimates at low and high values of predicted earnings. In our case, the classification exercise is on participation, which

covariates), we have a single predicted value for each participant over age 50. We then divide this sample into always exiters and others by selecting a cutoff in the fitted value to match our empirical distribution. We then classify individual *under* age 50 as never exiters or other by taking the average of the five fitted values we obtained from the aforementioned LASSOs.

For the second step, the training sample includes the under 50 individuals that are *not* classified as always exiters. We use an analogous LASSO prediction exercise to further split that sample into induced exiters and never exiters. We again take averages of the five predicted values for each participant over age 50 who is *not* an always exiter, to further classify them as induced exiters or never exiters.

The result of this two-step classification procedure is a sample classified into neverexiters, induced exiters, or neither. We estimate RDs among the never-exiters and among the induced exiters to measure income and incentive effects. The results are presented in the table below.

While we selected LASSO as our main specification, we also tried using boosted trees from the R package xgboost. The predictive power of the tree was not meaningfully better, and the results were not notably more stable. We therefore opted for the more well-known and computationally less expensive LASSO method.

is highly correlated with earnings and therefore could still make us vulnerable to this form of bias. We use this sample-splitting technique to protect our estimates from this systematic bias.

	Never exiters (incentive effect)	Induced exiters (income effect)
Panel A. Employment Discontinuity 95% CI Control Mean	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \\ [-0.054, 0.187] \\ 0.209 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.051 \\ [-0.090, \ 0.232] \\ 0.209 \end{array}$
Panel B. Earnings Discontinuity 95% CI Control Mean	$21.9 \\ [-141.6, 174.3] \\ 246.7$	$20.3 \\ [-253.8, 243.6] \\ 251.4$

Table D.1: Income vs. Incentive Effect at 24 months

Notes: Table shows regression estimates on sub-samples produced by machine learning procedure to decompose earnings changes at 24 months into income effects and incentive effects. "Induced exiters" correspond to SNAP recipients predicted to exit in the presence of work requirements, but not in their absence. "Never exiters" correspond to SNAP recipients predicted to remain on SNAP in the presence of work requirements. Changes in labor market outcomes for these two groups estimate income and incentive effects, respectively. Control mean is the predicted mean of the corresponding outcome variable immediately to the right of the age 50 threshold (the intercept with the cutoff). For each outcome, the 95% CI is calculated by bootstrapping using 1,000 replications, taking the 2.5th and 97.5th quantiles. Estimates of the discontinuity and control mean are calculated by averaging the estimates from all bootstrap replications. Employment and earnings are measured from UI records. Earnings include those with zero UI earnings, and are winsorized at the 99 percent level by yearly age within each calendar month.